Inside a regime’s last days: Mubarak and his inner circle during the 2011 revolution

President Hosni Mubarak was not pleased. In February 2010, Mohamed ElBaradei, the popular Nobel Peace laureate, had announced in a televised interview with host Amr Adib that he was considering mounting an election challenge to Mubarak for the presidency.

“He was extremely upset by ElBaradei’s remarks,” one of Mubarak’s ministers said days after the beginning of the January 2011 revolution. “He felt that ElBaradei had betrayed his generosity and confidence in him after he had supported his nomination for director of the International Atomic Energy Agency in political discussions and after he had awarded him the Order of the Nile [Egypt’s highest state honor] in 2006.”

What especially bothered Mubarak was that someone would dare to do so publicly and confidently challenge him, the minister said. ElBaradei’s stature posed a different kind of threat to Mubarak than, for example, during the 2005 presidential election — the first multi-candidate vote in Egyptian history — when his opponents, including former MP Ayman Nour, had little popular backing.

According to several former ministers who served in Mubarak's last government, the president could not tolerate even the slightest rivalry, as evidenced by the fates of his former Defense Minister Mohammed Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala and former Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, both of whom were eventually sidelined after their popularity grew. According to an aide to Mubarak in the final years of his rule, what particularly bothered Mubarak about ElBaradei was that, unlike Moussa and Abu Ghazala, ElBaradei had an ability to speak to the street and address popular grievances, such as police brutality, election rigging and an authoritarian style of governance.

The threat posed by ElBaradei to Mubarak only grew when the group that he founded, the National Association for Change, launched a nationwide campaign in 2010 to collect signatures for a proposed set of reforms aimed at ensuring free and fair presidential elections that were scheduled for the fall of 2011. There was widespread speculation at the time about whether Mubarak, who was 82 at the time and had been in power for nearly 30 years, would run for another five-year term or would throw his weight behind his son, Gamal, who was seen as being groomed for the presidency having risen through the political ranks beginning in 2002 with his appointment to the influential Policies Committee of the National Democratic Party.

According to a member of the Policies Committee interviewed in early 2010, Mubarak had no intention of actually backing Gamal’s candidacy. His sole intention was to continue as president until the last day of his life, a date that “only God knew.” Yet according to a government source who spoke on the matter in the second half of 2010, the leadership of the Armed Forces had begun to take seriously the notion that the presidency could be passed on to Gamal. In a meeting of senior military officials around that time, the secretary-general of the Defense Ministry rejected the idea of Gamal’s succession, which later made the notion of deposing Mubarak — when the time came — easier, the government source said.

Mubarak had long been able to maintain power with a cool-handed decisiveness gained through years of political experience in office, the former minister said. Yet, he was also facing a number of personal crises, including failing health seen most in explicitly in his need to have surgery to remove his gallbladder in March 2010, which followed the sudden death of his eldest grandson a year earlier.

ElBaradei’s popular 2010 signature drive had rattled Mubarak and others in his inner circle, particularly NDP Political Bureau member Kamal al-Shazli (who died in November 2010) and Information Minister Safwat al-Sherif (who died this month). Gamal Mubarak — who never explicitly confirmed or denied his presidential aspirations — saw potential opportunities for himself in the widening political debate.

Mubarak’s closest confidante, intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, was also deeply concerned about the political momentum behind ElBaradei, as was his ruthless interior minister of 15 years, Habib al-Adly, according to Mubarak’s former minister. By the end of summer 2010, Adly was explicitly urging Mubarak to suspend or somehow disrupt the internet in Egypt as a way to clamp down on opposition organizing, the minister said. Yet, Mubarak was reluctant. His son Gamal and his neoliberal economic team, along with Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, all feared blocking the internet would set off a wave of international criticism, including from the United States, who had been pressuring Mubarak since 2005 on issues concerning democracy and human rights.

Instead of disrupting the internet or blocking social media sites like Facebook, Gamal Mubarak and Ahmed Ezz, a steel tycoon and then-secretary general of the NDP, persuaded the president to try and work on expanding his base of popular support in order to counter the growing opposition, the minister said.

Mubarak was also contending with a change of leadership at the White House with President Barack Obama taking office in January 2009 and was keen to defuse some of the tensions that had marked his relationship with his predecessor, George W. Bush. Obama’s visit to Cairo in June 2009 had left many of Mubarak’s top foreign affairs advisors with the impression that Mubarak would need to present a more modern image to the young American president in a scheduled visit to Washington that had been pushed back from the spring to fall 2010.

According to another member of the NDP Political Bureau, Ezz had assured Mubarak that the NDP would be able to mobilize youth across the country and that the political situation would improve after an anticipated successful outcome for the NDP in the 2010 parliamentary elections slated to include the participation of opposition parties.

The prognosis could not have been more wrong.

The elections were marked by extensive manipulation and voter suppression organized by the ruling party. Two party sources interviewed separately after the revolution said NDP leaders gave direct orders to contain large numbers of voters that turned out in support of Muslim Brotherhood candidates. Rather than vindicate Mubarak’s rule, the elections drained nearly all remaining credibility from the electoral system and came to stand as a stark manifestation of Egypt’s corrupt political climate.

Then came the revolution in Tunisia with mass protests kicking off in December. Facing an unprecedented mass mobilization, Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali shakily addressed the country, telling demonstrators their message had been received and that he “understood” their demands for freedom. Mubarak was taken aback by the popular uprising, according to his aide. When he asked his advisors, one of them told him that Ben Ali had been too oppressive and the lack of a safety valve had led to an explosion on the streets. He added that economic conditions in Tunisia were dire and that France, Ben Ali’s main ally, was wavering in its support. 

“Egypt is not Tunisia” quickly became the mantra of Egyptian officials questioned by the domestic and international press. Yet within the corridors of power, there were some who understood there was some truth to the comparison between the two countries. A pair of reports issued in the early 2000s by the Arab League in concert with the United Nations Development Program concluded that there was widespread dissatisfaction among the youth in Arab countries with socioeconomic conditions as well as civil liberties and personal freedoms.

On January 20, 2011, as calls for planned demonstrations against the police on January 25 — National Police Day —were growing in Egypt, Mubarak headed to Sharm el-Sheikh for an economic and social summit of regional leaders. Ben Ali had been ousted from power on January 14 and Tunisia was noticeably absent from the summit. Mubarak seemed as self-assured as ever, and Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit asserted once again that Egypt was not Tunisia. However, Amr Moussa, then the secretary-general of the Arab League, addressed the summit and said that what happened in Tunisia was relevant to the gathering and that the Tunisian situation should not be far from the minds of the assembled leaders.

Moussa’s speech angered Mubarak, according to an Egyptian diplomat, for what he saw as the secretary-general signaling his own political ambitions, albeit in a far less direct way than ElBaradei had. Moussa would later tell the press that, although he expected a wave of discontent in Egypt, he did not expect Mubarak to be forced out as Ben Ali had been earlier that month.

According to an official who worked in the office of Habib al-Adly, Mubarak’s interior minister at the time, everyone had closely followed the events in Tunisia and knew that demonstrations were planned for January 25. But no one imagined how events would play out, particularly Adly, who did not anticipate the scale of the protests.

On January 23, Mubarak headed to the newly inaugurated Mubarak Police Academy in New Cairo to take part in celebrations for Police Day. Before entering the auditorium, he sat down with Adly and his senior aides, according to Adly’s former aide. During the meeting, the officials told Mubarak they anticipated anti-government protests and that some demonstrators might aspire to imitate the mass uprising in Tunisia — though no one expected a similar outcome for Egypt. Mubarak responded by telling Adly he would not tolerate any degree of disorder in the country.

After a private conversation with Mubarak and another with Omar Suleiman, Adly decided to deploy Central Security Forces to Tahrir Square on the morning of January 25 with the aim of preventing any demonstrators from gathering there, according to Adly’s former aide. Adly was more than a little concerned about the protests, but he was certain that the Muslim Brotherhood — the largest political opposition group in the country — sought to avoid antagonizing the security apparatus given that its members had faced years of police harassment and were not planning to take part.

Few who participated in the January 25 demonstrations had expected such a massive turnout, with thousands of people from diverse walks of life taking to the streets in cities across the country. One protester at the forefront of the demonstrations said the desire for police reform and the end of torture and abuse in detention facilities under Adly’s rule was the prime rallying call. Others also pointed to socioeconomic demands that had steadily grown in the years leading up to the revolution, demands for political reform like those made by the Kefaya movement, or calls for free and fair elections led by the ElBaradei and the National Association for Change. “When we went out on January 25, we weren’t thinking we would end Mubarak’s rule,” said one elderly demonstrator.

Many pointed to Tunisia’s revolution as a source of inspiration and felt that, after years of social and economic discontent, they had nothing to lose. The protesters managed to briefly take control of Tahrir on January 25 only to be forcibly dispersed by security forces that evening. A much larger demonstration was planned for January 28, dubbed the Friday of Rage. That morning, Adly held an early meeting with his aides to evaluate the situation. The general assessment was that security forces should not tolerate the demonstrations, and a go-ahead was given for police to engage, according to Adly’s former aide and a former security official at the presidential palace.

At around the same time, following a private meeting at Mubarak’s residence between the president and Suleiman that lasted more than an hour, orders came down from the president’s office to cut off the internet, according to the presidential palace source and a former Cabinet member who vehemently opposed the move as a “disastrous measure that would prompt an international outcry.” Mubarak was unwilling to brook any debate on the issue. He was convinced the internet was allowing angry youth to assemble and that, if their ability to communicate and mobilize were disrupted, authorities would be able to contain the situation. In an unprecedented move, nearly all access to the network was cut off and cellular service was shut down.

Hundreds of protesters were killed by security forces on January 28 in fierce street battles that engulfed large parts of the capital and cities across the country. The chant that filled the air was clear: "The people demand the fall of the regime." By the late afternoon, the police were forced to surrender the streets. According to sources at the Interior Ministry, the presidential palace, the NDP and the Cabinet, it was then that the president ordered the Armed Forces to deploy troops to the streets, fearing the possible seizure of sensitive government buildings, including the radio and television headquarters, known as Maspero, and Mugamma, a massive government administrative complex in Tahrir.

Mubarak called on Information Minister Anas al-Fiqqi and Presidential Spokesperson Suleiman Awad to work with his aides to draft a speech in which he would appeal to the nation for calm and display some willingness to concede to some of the revolution’s demands, the same sources said. Mubarak received several drafts and reviewed them with Fiqqi and his son, Gamal, before taping a version that incorporated language from the various versions. After the taping, Fiqqi instructed Abd al-Latif al-Menawy, the chair of the Egyptian Radio and Television Union, to soften the media rhetoric attacking the demonstrators, according to a former anchor at the state-owned Nile News. 

According to the president’s aide, although Mubarak was trying to maintain his composure, he was shaken. Not only had Adly, his trusted interior minister, failed to contain the protests despite his repeated assurances to do so, but Suleiman was advising him that the situation was volatile and he would need to make a number of concessions. This flew in the face of the president’s approach throughout his three decades in power, in which he had never made any decision in response to popular pressure alone.

In the days that followed, Mubarak dismissed the Nazif government, widely unpopular for its neoliberal policies, and, for the first time in 30 years, he appointed a vice president, Omar Suleiman. Mubarak also tapped Ahmed Shafiq — a military man, a confidante of the president and a former minister of civil aviation — to be prime minister. However, Mubarak’s longtime defense minister, Hussein Tantawi, did not seem pleased with the appointments. According to several government and presidential sources, Tantawi took umbrage at what he saw as Suleiman’s exclusive access to the president, while he viewed Shafiq’s conduct as arrogant. Mubarak’s son, Gamal, was equally unimpressed with the move. According to the former policy committee source, Gamal thought that his father was making too many concessions too early. The president, however, believed that serious concessions were needed in an attempt to contain the anger in the streets.

Mubarak then tasked Suleiman with holding talks with opposition leaders. According to the Mubarak aide, the president was looking to concede the minimum number of protester demands necessary to defuse the crisis. Even then, the president did not anticipate stepping down, the source said.

Suleiman, who had begun talks with opposition figures across the political spectrum, told Mubarak he might be able to contain the situation if the president declared he did not intend to run for another term and that his son, Gamal, would not run for the presidency, according to Mubarak’s aide. The advice did not sit easily with Mubarak, who believed he had already made unprecedented concessions with the appointment of a vice president for the first time and a significant reshuffle of his government and the NDP. Nevertheless, the president had received word from several key Egyptian ambassadors abroad that there was widespread sympathy for the protesters in political circles and that there were no real pledges to support Mubarak despite some public statements by officials to the contrary.

Meanwhile, Mubarak was losing support with the United States, his most powerful ally. The Obama administration had dispatched former US Ambassador to Egypt Frank Wisner to Cairo to deliver a message to Mubarak that he must immediately start a transition of power.

According to the aide, Mubarak summoned his spokesperson and office director Awad and instructed him to write another speech in which he would affirm to the nation that he did not intend to run for another term, but that he was a soldier and a patriot and he would die and be buried in his homeland. A short meeting with Shafiq and another with Tantawi helped Mubarak steel himself to record the speech. He looked visibly strained and exhausted, and it was clear that the recording had been edited once it was aired. 

After the speech aired on February 1 at 10 pm, Mubarak received a report from Suleiman that the speech was having a positive impact. Suleiman promised he could reach an understanding with opposition leaders to allow Mubarak to stay in office for a final six months, according to the presidential palace source, the former minister and the Mubarak aide. However, public sentiment in Tahrir suggested otherwise.

In the end, it made little difference. The next day, February 2, government thugs, some on camel and horseback, attacked the Tahrir sit-in. Not only did the brazen attack fail to disperse the protesters, it dispelled whatever faint possibility existed of them leaving the square voluntarily.

According to a source who was following developments from within a security agency, what came to be known as the “Battle of the Camel” was sanctioned by a number of state officials. It may have even been sold to Mubarak as a way to end the crisis — believing his speech had garnered enough public sympathy that they could deal with a minority of protesters camped out in Tahrir. Instead, the attack on the square signaled the moment when Mubarak’s departure became all but certain, the security source said.

Meanwhile, Tantawi sent his right-hand man, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, then director of military intelligence, to the square to feel things out. Sisi openly met with a number of revolutionary leaders and suggested they consider the implications of a political void created by a sudden vacancy in the presidential office and pledged that the Armed Forces would not allow the revolution’s demands to be abandoned. Yet, protesters in Tahrir remained unwavering in their calls for Mubarak’s ouster. 

According to the Mubarak aide, the stubborn president appeared simultaneously enraged and despairing. He seemed aware that he had little support left, and he sensed that the military was growing restless with the volatile situation as it sought to avoid any direct confrontation with protesters.

Mubarak’s family and his closest advisors were advising him to wait and not rush to step down, according to the aide. Yet, Tantawi and Suleiman advised him that it may already be too late. They were worried demonstrators would head to the presidential palace in Heliopolis and the situation would spiral out of control.

On the morning of February 11, Mubarak summoned Tantawi and Suleiman for a closed-door meeting, according to the aide. The president informed them he intended to go with his family to their residence in Sharm el-Sheikh. Suleiman went to his office to write a statement announcing the president’s departure, declaring that Mubarak had “decided to renounce all the duties of the office of the presidency and instructed the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to run the affairs of the country.”

Suleiman called Mubarak to get his approval on the language and then taped his now famous 30-second address, which he ordered the information minister to broadcast immediately, according to the aide. He allowed a few hours for Tantawi to increase the military's presence on the streets before the announcement was aired and for the Mubarak family to board the presidential plane one last time for their trip out of Cairo.