Sudan Nashra: RSF seizes military’s last stronghold in West Kordofan | Military advances into SPLM-N territory in South Kordofan | Afwerki pushes for Russian logistical center on Sudan’s Red Sea coast in Port Sudan meetings | UN envoy probes Khartoum for new political track

While the map of military control in south-central Kordofan is rapidly shifting, Port Sudan hosted two high-profile visits on Saturday — one looking to capitalize on a regional landscape in flux, and the other seeking to bring the military-led government to a political process grounded in current realities: an RSF-controlled west and a population facing the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki arrived for what Eritrean and Sudanese sources described as a visit carrying the potential of an upscaling of strategic relations between the countries. According to a source in the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Afwerki pressed TSC leaders for the stalled Russian logistical center on the shared Red Sea coast — a move the source said Eritrea sees as strengthening coastal security at a time when Ethiopia continues to escalate threats over reclaiming the Assab port. 

According to an Eritrean media source, the visit is part of a calculated effort to reinforce Eritrea’s position in the Red Sea arena, whether through security coordination or a political presence that counters Ethiopian influence. For Khartoum, the rapprochement offers a chance to cautiously seek maritime arrangements that could help protect its supply lines without loudly signaling a new alignment in the Horn of Africa’s tense geopolitical landscape, a Sudanese diplomatic source told Mada Masr.

Also arriving in Port Sudan on Saturday was UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra. Political and diplomatic sources told Mada Masr he is attempting to rework the UN’s role in the country after a period of tension between the TSC and UN agencies, while supporting African Union efforts to convene a political meeting slated for December, following the postponement of a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue originally planned for early October.

Lamamra, according to one of the sources, was testing the Sudanese leadership’s willingness to engage in a new political track based on the realities on the ground, which would entail concessions from both sides.

On the battlefield, the week saw significant reconfigurations across Kordofan. Despite the military’s denial, the RSF captured the city of Babanusa, the military’s final stronghold in West Kordofan, after a two-year siege. The hours-long battle saw extensive use of RSF drones fitted with fiber-optic systems designed to evade detection and jamming, according to a military source.

Commanders and troops from the military’s 22nd Infantry Division in the city withdrew to Heglig, another military source said, where a former officer expects the RSF to direct its next offensive in the state.

Further south, in South Kordofan State, the military retook eight areas held for nearly 14 years by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, the RSF’s ally led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu, whose forces have carried out forced recruitment campaigns across the state in recent weeks. The military is pushing along multiple fronts in South Kordofan in an attempt to break the joint RSF-SPLM-N sieges of Kadugli and Dalang.

The unprecedented surge in military operations across Kordofan in recent weeks has triggered fast-moving waves of displacement. Cities absorbing the influx are reeling as populations spike and infrastructure collapses. With administrative structures failing and authorities unable to respond to the crisis, volunteer initiatives are trying to step in to fill an ever-widening gap.

Residents, activists and volunteers across the three Kordofan states spoke to Mada Masr of what it means to live amid frontlines that change by the day, where cities and towns are treated as depots for supplies and forced recruits.

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RSF seizes military’s last stronghold in West Kordofan

After 23 months of siege, the RSF said on Monday that it took control of the city of Babanusa, the military’s last stronghold in West Kordofan. The military asserted a day later that its forces had repelled the attack.

Three military sources, however, told Mada Masr that the headquarters of the 22nd Infantry Division in Babanusa had in fact fallen, with military units withdrawing after heavy battles.

One of the sources said the RSF captured the division’s headquarters after more than six hours of intense clashes in which the paramilitary forces relied heavily on drones, ultimately prompting military commanders in the city to withdraw.

The RSF, according to the source, tipped the scales in its favor by deploying drones equipped with fiber-optic systems that evade detection and jamming. After capturing the division, RSF fighters seized a large number of vehicles, weapons and ammunition, the source said.

Another source said some of the withdrawing military units reached Heglig, which hosts one of Sudan’s largest oil fields.

The military and the RSF traded conflicting accounts of the situation in Babanusa. While the RSF declared full control of the city, the military said it had foiled the attack.

In a statement on Tuesday, military spokesperson Assem Awad said that their forces “repelled a new RSF attack” on the city.

Awad took the opportunity to dismiss the RSF’s unilateral ceasefire declaration as a “political and media maneuver” aimed at misleading public opinion and diverting attention from the RSF’s attacks on Babanusa and the Emirati support it receives.

On Tuesday, RSF fighters posted videos of themselves inside the division’s headquarters. RSF soldiers can be seen in the videos displaying seized weapons, ammunition and military vehicles.

A former military officer told Mada Masr that Babanusa’s strategic importance had waned after Fasher fell and the military struggled to advance toward Darfur. Under the circumstances, he said, repositioning forces elsewhere was the most viable option, given the tight siege on the city and the difficulty of sending in food and military supplies.

He said the RSF may next attempt to target Heglig and possibly mount operations around North Kordofan’s Obeid, though he noted that the military’s recent use of mobile, roaming units had helped disrupt the encirclement tactics the RSF used in both Fasher and Babanusa.

Babanusa was the last major military stronghold in West Kordofan. For almost two years, the city’s division held out against repeated attacks and a prolonged siege that pushed its entire population out.

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Military advances into SPLM-N territory in South Kordofan

The military retook eight areas that had been held for nearly 14 years by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu, two military sources told Mada Masr.

According to a field source, the 10th Infantry Division established control over the areas of Tabsa, Damra, Shawaya, Gebeilat, Sanadra, Julia and Morib on Sunday after heavy clashes that forced the SPLM-N to retreat to other positions.

Military soldiers posted videos on Monday in the newly captured locations.

The military also regained control of the Mabsut area in southern South Kordofan on Tuesday, a senior military officer told Mada Masr. He said SPLM-N fighters incurred heavy losses in personnel and equipment during the clashes.

The renewed surge in fighting in South Kordofan marks the most significant escalation the region has seen since the war broke out, as the military pushes along multiple fronts in an attempt to break the joint RSF-SPLM-N sieges of Kadugli and Dalang.

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Afwerki in Port Sudan for ‘working meetings’

Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki touched down in Port Sudan on Saturday for a visit Eritrean and Sudanese sources described as carrying the potential of an upscaling of strategic relations between the countries, as the visit comes at a highly sensitive regional moment.

According to an informed TSC source, the sessions focused on security, border coordination, Red Sea navigation and economic cooperation. The nature of the talks, the source said, resembled “working meetings” geared toward actionable steps rather than diplomatic courtesies.

Afwerki was met with an elaborate welcome — first received at the airport, then in public squares where Port Sudan residents gathered to greet him, and later at the newly restored Qasr al-Sharq, now home to Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s office and residence, for its inauguration. His reception was followed by a series of meetings with TSC leadership.

Discussions centered on strengthening security and intelligence cooperation, particularly border protection and establishing channels to exchange information on suspicious activity along the coast, according to the TSC source. The talks also explored prospects for activating logistical and commercial cooperation through Port Sudan, including links to Eritrea’s transport networks or mutual facilitation of shipping and maritime services.

According to the source, Afwerki urged swift progress on the Russian logistical and technical support center on Sudan’s Red Sea coast, where talks between Khartoum and Moscow have stalled since October. For Asmara, the Russian hub on the Red Sea coast is a means of strengthening coastal security amid escalating tensions over maritime access between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the source said.

For two years, Ethiopia has been insisting on what it calls its “legitimate right” to maritime access, repeatedly pointing to the Eritrean port of Assab on the Red Sea — a port that an Ethiopian military official called “our survival interest worth paying any price for” in recent months.

The breadth of issues Burhan and Afwerki discussed in Port Sudan, the TSC source said, reflects a shared understanding that the Red Sea can no longer be left without clear arrangements, and that any rapprochement between Khartoum and Asmara could feed into wider efforts to re-engineer the emerging balance of power in the region.

Relations between Sudan and Eritrea have historically been marked by ebbs and flows driven by shifts in leadership, particularly in the foreign ministry.  Yet high-level visits have continued, including visits by Burhan to Asmara.

An Eritrean media source in Asmara noted that understanding Eritrea’s motives requires reading both its domestic and regional posture. Eritrea is a politically centralized state where foreign policy decisions are directly tied to the regime’s security calculations. Its leadership has long adopted forceful approaches in dealing with its neighbors and has been an active party in regional conflicts in recent years.

This, the source said, makes Afwerki’s visit a calculated step aimed at reinforcing Eritrea’s position in the Red Sea equation — whether through security cooperation or through a political presence that allows it to counter Ethiopian influence or balance other regional powers. With global attention absorbed by the Sudanese war, Eritrea sees an opportunity to expand its influence in an area it has long considered part of its biosphere.

For Sudan, a Sudanese diplomatic source describes the visit as “an attempt to rebuild a regional support network at a moment of political and military suffocation.”

Rapprochement with Asmara provides Sudan’s authorities with an avenue to gather border security backing and possibly secure maritime arrangements that could help protect supply lines through Port Sudan. But the rapprochement remains cautious: extensive security cooperation with Eritrea could be interpreted as a new alignment within the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical landscape — particularly amid ongoing friction between Asmara and Addis Ababa, according to the source.

A senior official in the Sudanese prime minister’s office said the implications of the visit could move in one of two directions: Either the Port Sudan meetings yield effective security and logistical coordination, improving border stability and some Red Sea utilities, or that the outcome remains limited to short-term tactical steps, such as information-sharing or opening military communication channels, without major economic expansion.

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UN envoy in Port Sudan to test waters

His visit comes at a moment of total political deadlock and escalating military confrontations. For Sudanese political and diplomatic sources, Lamamra’s presence in Port Sudan signaled that the UN is reassessing its approach to the crisis as it acknowledges that the current impasse risks tipping the country into a situation that can no longer be contained — regionally or internationally.

A political source in Port Sudan said Lamamra is working to shore up African Union efforts to convene a political meeting planned for December in Djibouti. 

According to a Sudanese source at the AU headquarters, both Lamamra and the AU are seeking to revive the political process at a time when many political forces continue to set conditions for participation in any talks.

The AU had originally scheduled a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue conference for early October in Addis Ababa, intended to take steps toward ending the war. But disagreements over who should participate and in what format derailed the plan, forcing the AU to postpone the dialogue.

During his visit, Lamamra held a series of meetings with Burhan, Prime Minister Kamel Idris and several civilian figures.

Discussions centered on three core issues: the worsening humanitarian situation, the absence of a viable political pathway and the potential for coordinated international pressure to push the parties toward preliminary understandings. Lamamra presented initial proposals to revive the political process, some built on a “confidence-building” approach, according to the AU source.

A Sudanese diplomatic source said what stood out during the visit was Lamamra’s attempt to rework the UN’s role in Sudan following a period of tension between the TSC and UN agencies.

Earlier in November, Sudan’s government declared the World Food Programme’s country director and the head of operations in Khartoum as personas non grata. A source at the prime minister’s office previously told Mada Masr that the decision originated from the TSC, which had grown increasingly frustrated after the WFP allowed aid trucks to enter through the Adre border crossing from Chad.

Government sources also told Mada Masr that Khartoum would not allow the independent fact-finding mission tasked by the UN Human Rights Council to launch an investigation into violations in Fasher to enter the country, insisting the probe “infringes on Sudan’s sovereignty.”

According to the diplomatic source, Lamamra appeared intent on restoring a level of trust that would allow for joint initiatives, without triggering sensitivities around international intervention. 

Although the meetings did not yield any formal agreements, they reflected a readiness on both sides to reopen a channel of communication that could later be leveraged in a phased settlement, the source said.

A political source in Port Sudan close to the prime minister’s office said the visit also carried an unstated objective: helping the UN build an updated understanding of who actually wields power on the ground, and assessing their capacity to honor any field or humanitarian arrangements. The UN needs an accurate reading of the changing balance of forces before putting forward any initiative, the source added, especially given the constantly shifting frontlines.

The UN also seeks to gauge the Sudanese leadership’s willingness to engage in a new political track — one that may require concessions from both sides, according to the source.

“From a broader perspective,” the source said, “the visit reflects a growing recognition that Sudan’s crisis has outgrown its national boundaries, and that its potential spillover — ranging from displacement flows to instability along the Red Sea — demands a more serious international response.”

With Fasher’s fall to the RSF in late October and Darfur — the base of its parallel government — now effectively under its control, the international community increasingly sees the reality on the ground as one that would inevitably push the two sides toward negotiating power sharing.

Both the AU initiative and the successive proposals put forward by the US-led Quad call for an inclusive political process involving all Sudanese actors, including the two warring parties. Khartoum, however, has consistently refused to take part in any process that would undermine its claim to sole legitimacy. The AU conference, according to a source in the regional body who spoke to Mada Masr in October, had aimed to move toward establishing a new transitional government to replace Sudan’s two parallel governments. The Quad, meanwhile, is pushing for a similar path toward an “inclusive” political dialogue with the aim of forming a joint executive authority to resume the political process during a three-year transition, Egyptian government sources said in early November after the fall of Fasher.

Burhan, however, once again dismissing the Quad’s latest proposal last week, has reverted back to the Jeddah Agreement, demanding RSF withdrawal from all areas it occupied since 2023.

Lamamra, drawing on his long experience in conflict mediation, sought to signal throughout his meetings that Sudan needs a settlement grounded in realities on the ground rather than diplomatic statements, and that any initiative lacking urgent humanitarian measures will quickly lose relevance, the political source said.

Even so, they added, “the outcomes of the visit depend entirely on what comes next.”

“If Lamamra can establish a permanent communication channel and present a practical framework convincing enough for all parties to secure a temporary de-escalation, his visit could mark the beginning of a limited but realistic political path,” the source said. “But if it remains a diplomatic gesture with no genuine follow-through, its impact will remain symbolic, especially with accelerating developments on the ground and the diminishing ability of any party to control the dynamics of the war.”

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Obeid at risk of humanitarian catastrophe

Throughout November, the city of Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, has witnessed waves of displacement made complex by the fast changing frontlines of the fighting.

Thousands have poured in from villages to its south, from Bara, Rahad and Shikan, and from areas bordering Darfur.

As territorial control over swaths of the Kordofan area has alternated between the military and the RSF, families have been forced into repeated exits and returns. Some displacement destinations have also fallen to the RSF, leading families to re-route toward Obeid.

Yet reaching Obeid has not brought relief. The city itself is under immense strain. Its population has increased significantly within weeks, while its already fragile institutions and public services remain far below what is needed to absorb the influx.

According to three Obeid residents, scenes of families camping along roadsides and in schoolyards and mosques have become part of the city’s daily reality. Public buildings are gradually turning into ill-equipped shelters where tightly packed tents stand shoulder to shoulder, offering almost no privacy or sense of safety.

A displaced resident from Bara described people moving constantly between sparse water points in search of drinkable water amid frequent network outages caused by fuel shortages and broken pumps. Many now rely on shallow wells, raising fears of waterborne diseases amid overcrowding and the absence of any functioning sanitation system in the sprawling informal camps.

With nighttime temperatures dropping as winter sets in, families are growing even more vulnerable. Most arrived with too few blankets, and the camps lack firewood or fuel for heating. Many now burn whatever they can find — trash, scraps of plastic — putting themselves at risk of suffocation and fires, according to the resident from Bara.

Obeid’s health situation is edging toward collapse. A medical source said hospitals are operating at less than half of their capacity and are short on essential medicines and intravenous fluids. Cases of diarrhea and child malnutrition are rising, according to the medical source.

A doctor on duty at Obeid Teaching Hospital described long queues of patients lining the corridors, while volunteers attempt to fill the gaps through mobile clinics that can only cover a small fraction of the displaced.

Some injured people arriving from frontline areas have been unable to receive proper treatment, the doctor added, either because hospitals cannot handle complex injuries or because there is not enough fuel to keep operation rooms running.

Inside the shelters, cases of infectious fever have begun to appear. Though still under assessment, they are seen as early warnings of a possible epidemic if the Red Crescent and Health Ministry joint teams do not intervene, the doctor said.

A growing sense of insecurity hangs over the city as reports of assaults increase, especially in peripheral areas where lighting and formal oversight are absent, a women’s rights activist told Mada Masr. Women, particularly those who arrived without family companions, say it is unsafe for them to move around after dark to fetch water or visit clinics. Some families have reported missing children amid the chaos of displacement, the activist said.

Still, local emergency committees and volunteers continue to offer initial support: distributing temporary food rations, providing first aid and attempting limited organization of newly arrived groups in the shelters.

A government secretariat source in the city said that by late November, “Obeid looked like a city gasping for breath under a humanitarian burden far beyond its capacity.” As displacement continues, the source said, the situation is approaching a point of no return: overflowing shelters, imminent health risks, collapsing services and real fears of a broader breakdown if safe humanitarian corridors are not opened and aid is not significantly scaled up immediately. 

“This is not a passing crisis. It is a steady slide into a full-fledged catastrophe — one that demands urgent, coordinated intervention before every effort becomes too late to save lives slowly being exhausted in the crowded camps and cold tents at the heart of Obeid,” the source said.

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Escalating clashes, administrative breakdown deepen West Kordofan’s humanitarian strain

West Kordofan, too, has been steadily pulled into a deepening humanitarian emergency throughout November, according to three residents in the state.

Towns that had remained relatively stable — such as Nuhud, Fula, Wad Banda, Khawi and Abu Zabad — have turned into overcrowded reception points for tens of thousands fleeing the intensifying fighting in their peripheries and rural areas. 

According to the residents, the displacement did not come in one wave, but in rapid, concentrated surges. Entire families arrived with virtually nothing after walking long distances or traveling in packed vehicles that often stalled along unsafe routes.

In Nuhud — the state’s largest city and main destination for the displaced — new arrivals are crammed into shuttered schools, public squares and the edges of informal settlements, a source in the city said. Spaces that once held dozens now shelter hundreds, and tents meant for temporary stays have effectively become permanent homes for families with no alternatives.

The city’s capacity to absorb newcomers collapsed quickly. Water networks are operating far below required levels due to fuel shortages and collapsed pumping lines, forcing both residents and newly displaced families to crowd around a handful of often untreated water points, raising the risk of waterborne diseases. According to the source, many displaced families describe daily journeys of several hours to collect small amounts of water, barely enough for drinking or cooking, while cases of dehydration and malnutrition — especially among children — continue to rise.

A second source in Fula, an important administrative center given its mostly intact infrastructure, said the movement of RSF-allied armed groups in and out of the city has upended the service system. Such semi-independent forces seek out cities to loot and secure logistical supplies such as fuel and medicine. 

Fula’s main hospital is now operating at a fraction of its capacity, the resident said, with some departments shutting down entirely due to staff shortages, power outages and depleted medical supplies. The remaining medical personnel are stretched beyond their limits as the city receives a steady flow of injured people from nearby clashes. With medicine scarce and supply chains disrupted, patients, especially those with chronic illnesses, now have virtually no access to treatment.

A third source, who moves between Khawi and Wad Banda, said both towns have turned into transit corridors rather than places of settlement. Displaced families arrive exhausted and disoriented, stay for a day or two, then move on toward larger towns or more organized camps. But these small towns cannot handle the temporary surge: their health centers offer only basic first aid, water points are few and local food stocks are insufficient even for the residents. Communities are forced to share the little they have, creating mounting social and economic strain, according to the source.

Conditions in the informal settlements around such cities and towns are even harsher, a government official in West Kordofan told Mada Masr. There is a shortage of latrines and no sanitation system, leaving open ground as the only option. With tents packed closely together, the smell of waste and food scraps now fills the air, raising fears of skin and respiratory diseases.

Women, the official said, face heightened insecurity: trips to water points or small markets carry risks of harassment or assault, especially in the evenings when the areas are completely dark. Many families no longer allow their daughters to leave the vicinity of their tents, which the official said deepens women’s isolation and psychological strain.

Education services in the state have collapsed, according to the source. Schools packed with displaced families can no longer receive students, and children who lost their schools back in their hometowns have found no alternatives in displacement cities. Some local initiatives have tried to set up makeshift classrooms inside shelters, but these efforts remain limited and rely on volunteers with minimal resources.

On food availability, the official said distribution is sporadic and inconsistent. Areas that are reachable receive small rations that last only a few days, while others remain entirely cut off due to insecurity or the collapse of roads. Every disruption in supply lines pushes prices in city markets to levels far beyond what displaced families — and even local residents — can afford. Many households now survive by sharing meals among several families, or by preparing thin soup from maize or rice when available — meals that do not meet the needs of children, the sick or pregnant women, according to the official.

The worsening situation is not only the result of high numbers of displaced people but also of the absence of any functioning institutions to manage the crisis. Local authorities have lost administrative and logistical capacity, and international organizations face severe access and mobility constraints, the official said. What remains are small volunteer-driven efforts: youth collecting modest donations to distribute among the most vulnerable families, women forming communal cooking groups and community elders trying to organize sleeping arrangements in schools to avoid chaos. But despite their nobility, these efforts fall short of the scale of devastation, the official said.

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Under threat of SPLM-N (Hilu) forced recruitment campaigns, villages empty out, communities mobilize

South Kordofan has seen an alarming wave of forced recruitment over recent weeks, attributed to elements of the RSF’s ally, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu, amid intensifying fighting and expanding military control in the region. 

These campaigns — ranging from direct abductions to coercive summons under threat — have driven many families to flee their villages to protect their children and youth, especially in areas near active frontlines.

Five eyewitnesses from the eastern mountains described armed groups entering villages late at night or during the chaos following clashes. They said fighters surrounded gathering points and local markets, separating young people from the rest of the community. Some abductees were transported in four-wheel-drive vehicles to remote training camps. Others were subjected to rapid field drills that, according to the witnesses, incorporated them into combat units before they had a chance to contact their families. Several incidents involved minors among the detained or abducted.

A government source in Kadugli said the campaigns in rural areas were marked by both violence and speed, leaving residents unable to protect their relatives or file immediate reports. In some of the most isolated villages, fear of forced recruitment became as powerful a driver of displacement as the fighting itself, with some villages left nearly empty after entire communities fled, according to the source. 

The sudden influx of displaced people has placed additional strain on receiving towns, where informal settlements lacking basic services have spread, deepening needs for clean water, health care and emergency shelter.

A former SPLM-N source told Mada Masr that the forced recruitment campaigns are not isolated incidents, but part of a broader breakdown in security amid the absence of state authority and the entrenched dominance of armed groups. In some areas, families were forced into compliance under threat of violence, compelled to surrender one or two members to avoid retaliation. According to the source, multiple households expressed fears that forced recruitment could become a means of sorting communities by coerced allegiance and tightening control over villages that remain outside full influence of these forces.

A volunteer in a local organization said South Kordofan’s closed security environment makes independent verification extremely difficult. Rugged terrain, the heavy presence of armed groups and shifting frontlines all hinder humanitarian and human rights actors from accessing affected areas or documenting incidents directly. With no functioning judicial or administrative authority to intervene, civilians’ accounts are conveyed mainly through informal networks or individual testimonies, which circulate with difficulty among communities and activists.

Local communities have also sought to resist by limited means, the volunteer said. Some villages have formed local protection committees to monitor unusual movements and organize collective escape plans when news of imminent recruitment emerges. Community leaders attempt to negotiate with armed groups, but these efforts often fail in the face of military power and the lack of guarantees preventing recurrence. 

“Each failed attempt to deter recruitment deepens the sense of helplessness within communities that already rely heavily on social cohesion to survive in a volatile environment,” the volunteer said.

Psychosocial support for children and youth who have escaped or been released is urgently needed, they said. Many suffer trauma from violence or forced isolation, with no safe pathways to resume normal life or reintegrate into their communities. Families of the missing, meanwhile, require legal and humanitarian assistance to document cases, search for their abducted relatives and coordinate with entities that may hold information on detention sites or field camps.

With independent investigative mechanisms absent, the volunteer said it is crucial to establish neutral teams capable of accessing affected areas, receiving reports confidentially and collecting evidence in ways that ensure the safety of survivors and witnesses. There is also an urgent need to open humanitarian corridors in areas most at risk of recruitment, allowing civilians to escape before abductions occur and enabling aid organizations to provide protection services effectively, according to the volunteer.