Sudan Nashra: Military retakes North Kordofan’s Bara, RSF attacks villages to its west | White Nile’s Kosti, South Kordofan’s Dalang under RSF fire | Military signals push to integrate armed movements, but leaders worry over loss of leverage

Speaking at a military camp in Khartoum on Saturday, Sudanese Armed Forces Assistant Commander-in-Chief Yasser al-Atta signaled the start of a process to integrate all irregular forces that have fought alongside the military during the war into the state’s security institutions “without exception.”

The move builds on a decree issued months earlier by Sudanese military chief and Transitional Sovereignty Council Chair Abdel Fattah al-Burhan placing all armed groups under the Armed Forces Act.

For the military, the step is intended to prevent armed groups from continuing to operate outside state authority after the war and reorganize the security landscape, two military sources told Mada Masr. With security challenges mounting across Sudan, incorporating the large numbers mobilized during the war into formal police and military institutions would bolster Khartoum’s ability to enforce security and stability in areas under its control, according to the two sources.

The integration plan would also encompass the forces of major armed movements signatory to the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement — a deal that grants them significant political entitlements, including guaranteed influence within the government and the TSC. Military and political sources within the armed movements told Mada Masr that some leaders worry that a rushed integration process without a settlement that preserves these entitlements could reduce the groups’ leverage, much of which stems from their direct command over their fighters and the mobilization networks they control.

Their concerns are also tied to the roles leaders within the groups currently hold. While some are active in military operations, others operate in political or organizational capacities. According to three sources in the armed groups, some leaders fear losing political influence to newly empowered military figures, potentially weakening their authority within the movements’ internal structures and over their social bases.

With both the military and the armed movements seeking to push back into Darfur, bringing the joint force under a unified command and logistics structure — rather than the current coordination mechanism — would align their operational calculations ahead of potential battles in the region, a military source and a source close to joint force operations commander Abdallah Gana told Mada Masr.

But past experiences, most recently in the wake of the seismic fall of Fasher, points to the precarity of such alliances between the state and armed groups. Both Burhan and the leaders of these armed movements have seen how similar arrangements can backfire as military and political circumstances shift.

Among the groups covered by the decision would be the Baraa ibn Malik Brigade, an Islamist force estimated to include around 20,000 fighters that have fought on several major fronts. The brigade was named this week in a United States State Department decision that designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.

The Foreign Ministry responded to the designation by reaffirming the government’s principled condemnation of “all forms of terrorism and violent extremism,” seizing the opportunity to reiterate its calls to designate the Rapid Support Forces a terrorist entity, citing documented violations including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and acts of terrorism.

The statement comes as RSF violence against civilians continues across multiple states. Last week, after the military announced it had retaken the North Kordofan city of Bara, the paramilitary group launched a deadly assault on the rural area of Um Kiredam, west of the strategic city. Bara is prized for its location along the Saderat Road, which links Kordofan with Khartoum State.

Residents of the villages said the attack began during peak activity in markets and neighborhoods. Artillery and drone strikes hit several villages, killing at least seven civilians and spreading panic across the area. Three residents said families fled in haste, with some seeking refuge in neighboring villages, while others traveled toward the state capital of Obeid and White Nile’s Kosti — cities that are themselves grappling with an uptick in RSF drone campaigns targeting homes and public facilities.

Dalang in South Kordofan also came under heavy RSF artillery fire that killed at least 14 civilians. The attack coincides with RSF mobilization in the state, in what a senior military officer said is an attempt to reimpose a siege on the city which has suffered a severe humanitarian collapse after nearly three years under blockade by the RSF and the allied Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu.

According to the officer, diverting RSF units mobilizing in South Kordofan was among the immediate objectives behind the operation to retake Bara.

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Military to begin merging allied forces into state institutions, sources in armed movements say leaders wary of diminished influence

In a move that could reconfigure the balance of power within the Sudanese Armed Forces’ broad political and military alliance, Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) member and Sudanese military Assistant Commander-in-Chief Yasser al-Atta announced on Saturday that the leadership will begin integrating forces that have fought alongside the military during the war into the state’s security institutions.

Atta said that commanders of the allied forces have agreed to the merger, though the main groups have not yet issued formal responses.

“Everyone who carried arms [...] without exception, will be integrated into the armed forces and the military institution,” Atta said in his address to soldiers in a military camp in Khartoum. He added that the military would also address the status of fighters unwilling to join formal security institutions by offering vocational training programs.

In August, TSC Chair and Sudanese military chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan issued a decree bringing all irregular armed groups fighting alongside the military under the Armed Forces Act, subjecting them to military law and command structures.

Among those forces are several major armed movements signatory to the Juba Peace Agreement — which already includes security-sector integration protocols — who joined the military early in the war and have since recruited thousands of new fighters. Other groups fighting alongside the military include the Popular Resistance Forces, the Baraa ibn Malik Brigade and the Sudan Shield Forces.

Integration has benefits for the armed forces and the military, who have grown closer since the fall of Fasher, as both have shrugged off ceasefire proposals that would have firmed up what is already a de facto division of Sudan. According to one source in the joint forces, these benefits include closer logistical coordination that should make the push toward Darfur more effective. 

However, while the military and armed movements see eye to eye on defeating the RSF today, concerns linger about how the war and a potential post-war political framework could change their position, military and political sources within the armed movements and military sources told Mada Masr.

For the military, there are clear aims in the integration efforts. 

According to a source in the military General Staff and another close to Atta, the leadership is pursuing several strategic objectives, chief among them is unifying command structures and preventing armed groups from operating outside state authority once the war ends, thereby reinforcing the state’s monopoly on arms.

Speaking to Mada Masr after Burhan’s decree in August, a former General Staff commander said that the military sees the decree as a strategic correction drawn from its past experience with the RSF, which gained autonomy under a 2017 law, while remaining strictly under the military’s command. Burhan’s order removes any form of comparable independence for allied forces, placing them directly under the military’s authority.

As security challenges continue to widen across Sudan, the move is also viewed as a key step in reshaping the country’s security landscape in the coming period. Integrating the large numbers mobilized during the war into regular police and military forces would strengthen Khartoum’s capacity to enforce security and maintain stability in areas under its control, the sources said.

A military source close to decision-making circles said the military’s General Command has already begun activating integration mechanisms, including compiling and verifying troop numbers and registering fighters without waiting for lengthy timelines.

But the process will be highly complex, a former official in the military’s personnel authority told Mada Masr, given the large number of fighters involved and the wide variation in their backgrounds and ages. The military institution would also need to reassess the field ranks that emerged during the course of the war according to criteria recognized within the armed forces in order to preserve the chain of command.

According to the former official, military service laws — foremost among them the Armed Forces Act — set specific conditions for recruitment, including age limits, educational qualifications, physical fitness and a clean criminal record. These criteria could present practical difficulties when processing fighters who joined the war effort through informal mobilization.

The military official in the General Staff added that the process must also address financial and service-related rights, including salaries, compensation, pensions and benefits related to combat injuries. Determining seniority and calculating effective years of service for wartime fighters will also require clear legal arrangements.

The military institution is currently preparing organizational and legislative arrangements that could include issuing new regulations or temporary legal amendments to manage the intake process, according to the military source close to Atta. 

Integration is also seen by both the military and the armed forces as a boon in the battle to retake Darfur. 

According to a source close to Abdallah Gana, the operations commander of the joint force, the group’s military leadership reassessed its position on integration after the battles in Fasher.

Pressured by their tribal and political bases in Darfur and determined to hold on to the region that constitutes their main bargaining chip with the state, the armed movements insisted on maintaining their presence in the city despite severe supply shortages. The experience exposed the logistical constraints of operating alongside the military as a separate formation. According to the source, a merger would help align the operational calculations of the military and the joint force. 

According to a military source at the military’s General Command, the military leadership views integration as a way to prepare for potential battles in Darfur and to replace the current joint coordination mechanisms there with a unified command and logistical structure. 

However, while the military establishment largely treats the process as an operational priority, Burhan is likely to face significant political constraints in carrying it out due to potential disputes with the armed movements, according to the source.

These disputes could stem, in part, from the fact that the integration process must take into account existing security arrangements, particularly the provisions of the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement governing the incorporation of armed movements into state security institutions.

The Juba agreement established eight protocols, including those related to restructuring Sudan’s security and military forces. While it called for the eventual integration of armed movement fighters into government forces, it did not provide detailed technical guidelines for the process.

The source compared the potential difficulty to disputes that emerged during the 2022 Political Framework Agreement, when the RSF rejected security arrangements proposed by the military institution. Burhan attempted to enforce the arrangements, the source said, but the dispute ultimately contributed to the RSF’s rebellion.

According to sources within the military-allied armed movements, reactions to Atta’s announcement vary. While three sources in the joint force of the armed movements said the principle is broadly supported, others raised concerns about how the process could affect internal political dynamics within the groups, as well as their dealings with the state and the military.

Both a senior source and a field commander in the joint force said the integration process effectively maintains the security arrangements outlined in the Juba agreement. The senior source described the move as a “natural step.”

But according to two sources in an armed movement, some political leaders — particularly those who do not command forces in the field — fear that rapid integration could weaken their political and organizational influence.

A senior source in the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Darfur Governor Minni Arko Minnawi said some movement leaders insist that the integration process must also take into account previous commitments. The new step, he said, should not conflict with the entitlements stipulated in the Juba agreement and must respect the political commitments outlined in the deal.

The agreement’s protocols include provisions on wealth and power sharing as well as political representation, many of which have already been implemented. Under its terms, the armed movements were granted seven federal ministries and two seats on the TSC, in addition to the establishment of the Darfur regional government.

A political source close to decision-making circles within one of the movements said some leaders believe the integration of forces should be preceded by a political settlement that guarantees the movements’ continued roles within the state. Without such guarantees, they worry the move could erode their leverage, which largely stems from their direct authority over fighters backing the military and the mobilization bases they control.

According to the political source and the two sources in the armed group, some leaders fear losing political influence to newly empowered military figures, potentially weakening the movements’ internal structures and the leaders’ authority over their social bases. With some leaders operating outside conflict zones or holding primarily political and organizational roles within the movements, the balance of power could also shift from political leaders to military commanders.

A senior source in the military’s General Command described such concerns as “common” in similar integration experiences. Processes of this kind often reshape internal balances between an armed movement’s military and political wings, he said.

Field commanders who control forces on the ground tend to support integration because it provides their fighters with a stable legal status within the state, he said, while some political leaders remain cautious, fearing the loss of their organizational influence.

An official in the General Intelligence Service said the military leadership is aware of these political sensitivities but views integration primarily through a security and strategic lens.

Three informed sources in the armed movements’ organizational structures said discussions are still ongoing within some armed movements about how to approach the next phase — particularly regarding the future relationship between the movements’ political leadership and military commanders who could eventually assume positions within the regular armed forces once integration is completed.

The issue is not merely a theoretical worry, however. 

After Fasher fell, and with the withdrawal of both the joint force and the military, the armed movements found themselves at the mercy of potential political deals between the military and the RSF brokered by intentional actors.

Speaking to Mada Masr in the wake of Fasher’s capture, a source in the General Intelligence Service said that a truce between the military and the RSF would have left the armed movements with nothing. They would have been left outside any new arrangement between the two sides — an outcome Minnawi, the most influential of their leaders, doesn’t want.

The source said that Minnawi’s political experience with agreements with the central government — referring to his 2006 agreement with former President Omar al-Bashir’s government — have left him deeply wary of such arrangements. 

A former member of SLM-Minnawi agreed with this assessment, saying that the battle for Fasher had placed the movements’ political leadership under the weight of Burhan’s choices rather than their own, and before RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo’s ambitions rather than their own vision. This made the Fasher battle decisive for the future of political alliances within the military camp and for the future of the war against the RSF, they said. 

Ultimately, the military chose to reject the ceasefire and to bring itself closer to the armed movements.  

According to a source close to Burhan’s office, the fall of Fasher marked a crucial moment in the relationship between the military and the armed movements, erasing the distance between political and military agendas and reinforcing a shared conviction around a single goal: eliminating the RSF and preventing it from securing any political gains.

Integration would cement that erasure of distance, even if new battles change the political calculation each side faces. 

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White Nile’s Kosti under RSF drone attacks

 

RSF drones target the city of Kosti in White Nile State, March 9. Source: @AbedaMoham6183 via X. 

The city of Kosti in White Nile State came under a series of RSF suicide drone attacks on Sunday and Monday, triggering panic among residents in the key military supply hub.

The city sits along major routes, linking central Sudan with the west and south, and has been a destination for people displaced from North Kordofan.

According to a military source and three residents, the strikes unfolded in two waves over two days. The first began Sunday evening, when ground defenses detected several drones approaching the city.

Most of the drones were shot down near military sites before reaching their targets, the military source from the command of the 18th Infantry Division in Kosti told Mada Masr. The drones, the source said, appeared to be targeting the division’s headquarters, several logistics facilities and Kosti’s dry port.

The following day, the attacks resumed with fewer drones, according to the source, but had the strongest impact on civilians.

According to the Sudan Doctors Network, one of the drone attacks on Monday struck a student dormitory, injuring seven students, some of whom are now in critical condition.

Ibrahim Karrar, a resident of the Radif neighborhood, which is located near several military installations, told Mada Masr that the drones were flying at low altitude before being engaged by anti-aircraft fire. Some strikes, he said, hit close to water and electricity facilities. A main transformer was damaged, causing a temporary power outage in several neighborhoods.

Another drone managed to approach a residential area before being shot down, Ahmed Ali, a shop owner near the main market, told Mada Masr. Debris from the drone partially damaged two houses and set a civilian car on fire, he said. The explosions forced the market to shut down for hours and brought internal transport to a halt amid fears of renewed strikes.

Sara Mohamed, a nurse at a local health center, said five civilians were treated for injuries caused by falling debris.

The attacks have heightened anxiety among residents, she added, with some of the displaced families now considering moving again to safer areas.

A former military officer said Kosti is the largest logistical hub for the military in the White Nile sector, suggesting the attacks may have aimed to disrupt military supply lines as well as the movement of goods toward North Kordofan.

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Military retakes North Kordofan’s Bara

 

Military retakes the city of Bara in North Kordofan, March 5. Source: Yasser Alfadol via X.

The military recaptured Bara, the second-largest city in North Kordofan, after heavy clashes with the RSF on March 5.

The campaign to retake the city began in early February, when military forces heavily engaged the RSF units stationed around Bara.

Control of Bara is a key strategic step as the city lies along the Saderat Road linking North Kordofan’s capital of Obeid with Omdurman in Khartoum State. The route serves as a critical corridor connecting Kordofan and Darfur with the capital.

In a statement on March 5, Sudanese Armed Forces spokesperson Essam Eddin Awad said that the military and allied forces regained control of the city following intense battles that inflicted heavy losses on RSF fighters and equipment, forcing the paramilitary to retreat and abandon vehicles and weapons.

A military source told Mada Masr that their forces prepared for the assault by establishing multiple ambushes around Bara before launching a surprise attack from the northern outskirts of Obeid. The operation was carried out under the cover of heavy drone strikes targeting RSF positions within the city, which the source said disrupted their ranks and forced a withdrawal. Pursuing forces advanced as far as the entrance to the town of Greigikh, west of Bara.

The source said dozens of RSF fighters were killed or wounded and others were captured. Military forces also seized combat vehicles equipped with double-barrel machine guns as well as troop carriers.

According to a source in the leadership of the Dar Hamar tribe, which spans West Kordofan and parts of North Kordofan, dozens of wounded RSF fighters were transferred to Eyal Bakhit and Nuhud in neighboring West Kordofan for treatment.

The RSF later mobilized additional forces from across the state and deployed them to Um Girfa and Gabra al-Sheikh in North Kordofan in an attempt to block further military advances and potentially retake the city, the tribal source added.

A senior officer told Mada Masr that the operation relied on a multi-axis combat strategy coordinated through mobile command centers, which allowed forces to synchronize attacks following extensive combing operations.

Retaking Bara, the officer said, creates a wider security buffer for Obeid. The city also functions as a key logistical hub, from which forces could either push north to secure the full length of the Saderat Road or advance west toward Um Girfa, Mazroub, Sodari, Um Badr and Hamra al-Sheikh, increasing pressure on RSF-held areas in northern West Kordofan.

The operation also aimed to divert the RSF units mobilizing in South Kordofan over the past week in an attempt to reimpose a siege on Dalang and Kadugli, according to the officer.

Bara has changed hands several times in recent months. In late October, the RSF seized the city just over a month after the military had reclaimed it, forcing residents of central neighborhoods to flee and causing widespread destruction to infrastructure. 

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RSF attacks villages near Bara, killing civilians, burning homes

Shortly after the military recaptured Bara, the RSF launched a deadly campaign on villages and markets in North Kordofan’s Um Kiredam area, west of Bara, killing at least seven civilians and injuring several.

Three residents said the assault began during peak activity in markets and neighborhoods. Heavy shelling involving artillery and drones struck several villages, triggering widespread panic, they said. 

One resident said three RSF vehicles entered their area. Fighters then set homes on fire and robbed residents and looted market stalls.

Residents of Um Kiredam rely on farming and local trade. Its main market serves as a hub for surrounding villages. In the aftermath of the attacks, however, commercial activity has largely halted, with markets closed and travel between villages severely disrupted, the residents said.

The violence forced families from affected areas to flee in haste. Some sought refuge in neighboring villages, others traveled toward Obeid and Kosti, according to the residents.

But Kosti itself has come under attack this week. Obeid was also targeted by a heavy five-day drone campaign last week that struck homes and service facilities across the city.

Saleh Abdallah, a resident of Obeid, said conditions there have deteriorated markedly amid the recurring attacks. Markets are only operating partially, he said, while prices of basic goods have risen by around 50 percent compared to the start of the year, placing additional strain on residents already grappling with falling incomes and a shortage of cash liquidity.

Fatima Bakhit, from Sheikan locality — where Obeid is located — said daily life has become increasingly difficult as some essential services have been disrupted and living costs continue to rise. Many families, she told Mada Masr, have been forced to cut back on food consumption and rely on help from relatives.

Fears of renewed clashes are also pushing some families to consider moving to safer areas, particularly after the recent rise in drone attacks targeting civilian locations across the region, she added.

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Dalang under RSF shelling, at least 14 killed

The city of Dalang in South Kordofan State came under heavy RSF artillery shelling on March 4 and 5, triggering widespread panic among its residents who have only just begun to see improvements in living conditions after the yearslong siege on the city was lifted in late January.

According to a government source and a medical source, shells struck the Freish and Marafid neighborhoods as well as the city’s main market, causing  extensive damage to homes, shops and public service facilities. Preliminary figures indicate that at least 14 people were killed and more than 80 were injured.

During the two days of bombardment, markets closed and residents sheltered in their homes or moved to relatively safer neighborhoods, the two sources said.

The artillery barrage came a day after Dalang was targeted by indiscriminate drone fire, as clashes resumed between the military and the RSF-SPLM-N (Hilu) forces around the city. The renewed fighting broke out only weeks after the military lifted the siege on the city imposed by the two allies for nearly three years.

The escalation came just as living conditions in the city were beginning to show modest improvement. After the siege was lifted and the Dalang-Kadugli road was reopened shortly after, aid and goods gradually began returning and commercial activity was starting to recover, South Kordofan’s Humanitarian Aid Commissioner Fadlallah Abdel Kader told Mada Masr. The supplies helped lower the prices of basic food items that had become scarce and prohibitively expensive during the siege, he said.

The city also saw a relative improvement in services at health facilities as shipments of medicine and medical supplies reached the city.

But after the recent attacks, supplies were disrupted and parts of the market were damaged, leaving residents fearful that living conditions could once again severely deteriorate if the military escalation continues, according to Abdel Kader.

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US designates Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization

The US State Department designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, naming the military-allied Baraa ibn Malik Brigade as part of the network. The department said it plans to add the group to its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations by March 16.

The designation builds on earlier measures imposed by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, which had targeted Islamist figures and affiliated companies with sanctions.

Among those sanctioned in September was the Baraa ibn Malik Brigade, a prominent Islamist unit fighting alongside the military and considered part of its reserve forces.

In announcing the new designation, the State Department accused the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood of using “unrestrained violence against civilians to undermine efforts to resolve the conflict in Sudan and to advance its violent Islamist ideology.”

Washington also alleged that the group has received support and military training from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. “The United States will use all available tools to deprive the Iranian regime and Muslim Brotherhood chapters of the resources to engage in or support terrorism,” the statement said.

The designation follows similar US moves against Muslim Brotherhood branches in Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan earlier this year, citing links to Hamas and alleged support for the Palestinian faction during Israel’s war on Gaza. 

Sudan’s opposition Sumud coalition swiftly welcomed the US designation, saying in a Monday statement that it “reflects the will of the majority of the Sudanese people” and calling on other countries and regional and international organizations to follow suit.

Hemedti also praised the decision, describing it as a “recognition of the grave violations and crimes committed by this group and its various fronts, including the ideology-driven ‘army,’ against civilians throughout the country for decades.”

The Foreign Ministry responded on Tuesday by reaffirming the government’s principled condemnation of “all forms of terrorism and violent extremism,” without exception, seizing the opportunity to reiterate its calls to designate the RSF as a terrorist entity, citing documented violations including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and acts of terrorism.