Sudan Nashra: Military’s large-scale operation in Bahri continues | Intelligence source says RSF strategic drones targeting Fasher operated from Chad | Economic sources say Sudan’s upcoming budget will continue to reflect war realities

In Bahri, northeast of Khartoum, where the Sudanese Armed Forces has been steadily advancing since September, fighting has intensified in December. 

The military has adopted a four-pronged strategy, working to secure a supply route connecting Omdurman, northwest of the capital, to its forces stationed in Khartoum.

Omdurman itself saw significant military gains earlier, with the RSF now confined to isolated pockets in the city’s west and south, while, in central Sudan’s Gezira State, the dominance the RSF once held over the region is waning as it faces the military’s ongoing siege of the state capital, Wad Madani, signaling an imminent takeover.

While the military continues to amass forces for the battle for Wad Madani, it is unclear yet when it plans to storm the city.

The military’s operations in Gezira, which was engulfed by the expanding war a year ago, are intrinsically linked to the battle for Khartoum. Any redeployment of RSF troops from Khartoum to Gezira creates exploitable gaps for the military in the capital. The RSF is now stretched thin across the mere 200 km between these two fronts.

Over 20 months into Sudan’s conflict, Khartoum, where the fighting first broke out, remains its pivotal battleground.

To the northwest, in North Darfur’s Fasher, which became a fateful front in May, the stakes are even higher. 

Fasher’s roughly one million residents continue to endure drone strikes, relentless shelling and severe shortages of medicine, food and other basic necessities. While direct clashes have subsided following months of intense battles, the RSF continues to launch high-explosive drone strikes from the Chadian border and other areas, primarily targeting civilian sites and causing dozens of casualties in the span of just one week.

The military’s ability to retain control of the city is critical for preserving cohesion in the broader war effort. Conversely, an RSF victory in Fasher would likely hand the entire Darfur region to the paramilitary group, raising the prospect of a centralized RSF authority in Darfur with Fasher as its capital. Such a scenario would also grant the RSF influence over cross-border dynamics with four of Sudan’s seven neighboring countries.

Bahri-Khartoum, Gezira and Fasher now form the three primary frontlines, with their military outcomes poised to profoundly shape Sudan’s future — whether the war continues, ends, or possibly recedes to localized zones. 

The areas continued this week to witness violent confrontations, which have been marked for weeks by rapid advances and counterattacks between the warring factions.

Economically, and for the second consecutive year, Sudan’s government has had no choice but to adopt a war-driven budget, though it has not been announced as such. The country’s macroeconomy has been fragmented along territorial lines controlled by various factions, crumbling under the strain of prolonged conflict. Khartoum, once Sudan’s industrial and commercial hub, has been reduced to ruins.

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Military continues to advance in Bahri 

The military has intensified in recent weeks its campaign in Bahri, northeast of Khartoum, adopting a four-pronged strategy to advance toward the Signal Corps on the northern bank of the Blue Nile. 

Major battles in the offensive, which has taken on an increasingly important place in the fight for the capital, played out over the past week, during which the military captured parts of Kafouri from the RSF and conducted airstrikes targeting RSF infrastructure in the area. 

Capturing the area would secure a route connecting Omdurman, northwest of the capital, to the Sudanese military’s forces in Khartoum City — facilitating the convergence of military forces on the General Command.

The fronts opened by the military in Bahri seek to connect its forces with those stationed in the Signal Corps camp. The camp’s position is critical, as it overlooks the General Command in Khartoum City and is situated between two key river crossings — the Armed Forces Bridge and the Blue Nile Bridge.

For 20 months, the military has managed to maintain control of the Signal Corps camp, reinforcing its defenses with the deployment of four brigades to support the forces stationed there.

Northern Bahri, meanwhile, has long been a strategic RSF stronghold. Since June 2023, the RSF has encircled key military bases in the area — namely the Weapons Corps camp in the Kadro military zone and the Hattab military base — securing control over western and northern Bahri, and the Jaili oil refinery area to the north. 

The military’s offensive on Bahri is coordinated from four fronts, all converging southward toward the Signal Corps camp, separated from the General Command only by the Blue Nile. 

Since December 11, military forces from the Weapons Corps camp and Hattab military base have advanced southward from northern Bahri to capture the neighborhoods of Samrab and Ezba.

From there, its forces pushed into the Kafouri neighborhood, where intense clashes broke out on December 15. The military was able to secure blocks 3 and 1 in Kafouri —  areas that had been held by the RSF since April 15, 2023.

The RSF’s stronghold in Kafouri is critical for maintaining its positions in the East Nile area, including the Manshiya Bridge, which connects Khartoum and Bahri, and the Soba Bridge, which links East Nile to strategic food and fuel supply points in eastern Khartoum State.

According to a field commander who spoke to Mada Masr, the first axis of the military’s combat in Bahri runs from the Hattab base to the Hajj Youssef area. The military managed to take control of the Dradoug neighborhood then Nabta before advancing into Haj Youssef, where it captured an RSF position on December 18.

The second axis of combat in Bahri begins at the Kadro military base, advancing through the neighborhoods of Drushab, Samrab and Ezba, ending in Block 6 of Kafouri, a field source told Mada Masr. This area houses a significant RSF camp. A military source in Samrab told Mada Masr that operations along this axis aim to destroy as many RSF positions as possible within the Kafouri blocks.

A military source in the control and operations room at the Hattab base, who spoke to Mada Masr, acknowledged the difficulty of the battles in Kafouri, due to the presence of RSF snipers and large ammunition depots, which bolster the paramilitary’s ability to resist the Sudanese Armed Forces’ offensive. The source added that Kafouri also houses an RSF intelligence center and military detention facilities.

The third axis extends from the Kadro base along Ingaz Street, ending in the Old Bahri area near the Signal Corps camp. This axis is among the most fiercely contested, as it is close to the industrial zone, where heavy RSF artillery is stationed. The military has launched intensive airstrikes in this area to disable RSF rocket launchers and artillery.

A source at the Wadi Sidna military base in Omdurman told Mada Masr that between November 30 and December 16, the military carried out around 18 airstrikes along Ingaz Street. These strikes targeted RSF fuel depots and ammunition stores.

The fourth axis of combat runs along Maouna Street, extending from the Halfaya Bridge to the RSF-held Bahri Market. The RSF has also stationed snipers across tall buildings in the area. 

A military source operating in this axis told Mada Masr that the military has been conducting a series of small, tactical operations to deplete the RSF. However, the source did not specify the nature of these operations or their effectiveness.

On Wednesday, the military seized the strategic Sultan Towers on Ingaz Street, the military source said. The towers had been used by the RSF as a base for jamming devices to counter military drone attacks. The military is expected to leverage this position to intensify its offensives across Bahri, according to the source. 

Meanwhile, an RSF source told Mada Masr that their troops are struggling with a food shortage due to disruptions in supply lines caused by the military’s advances in the neighboring Gezira State which have cut off the provisions entering Khartoum. The source said that this crisis is similar to a previous food shortage in Old Omdurman, where military pressure across multiple axes disrupted supplies and destabilized the RSF on critical frontlines.

A source from the East Nile Resistance Committees told Mada Masr that RSF combatants have been looting food supplies meant for residents and pressuring them to evacuate East Nile areas entirely.

A military source told Mada Masr that the RSF’s strategy involves forcing residents into open areas while using their homes for cover to deter airstrikes by the military. This tactic prolongs confrontations and allows the RSF to exploit any government actions to facilitate humanitarian aid, the source added. The source accused the RSF of endangering civilian lives and causing forced displacement, in violation of international laws and agreements, including the Jeddah Declaration.

Bahri has now superseded the strategic Mogran area, which was initially expected to serve as the crossing point for military forces advancing from Omdurman to the General Command in central Khartoum, as the focal point of the battle for the capital. In the battle for the capital, the military has been aiming to connect the General Command with the Signal Corps camp in Bahri. From there, the military could cross the Blue Nile Bridge to reach the General Command.

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RSF strategic drone strikes target Fasher

Fasher continued this week to endure relentless RSF attacks, although the group has still been unable to capture the city despite its eight-month siege.

North Darfur’s Health Minister Ibrahim Khater told Mada Masr on Thursday that 74 people were killed and 587 were injured over the course of last week. 

Khater noted that only two hospitals and seven primary healthcare centers remain operational in the state.

A military intelligence source from the Sixth Division told Mada Masr that the RSF is attempting to destroy as many vital facilities in the city as possible, aiming to render life in Fasher unbearable. As such, it has intensified its use of drones following repeated failures in infantry assaults, the source said. 

The RSF employed a similar scorched earth approach in West Darfur’s Geneina and South Darfur’s Nyala, where prolonged sieges on military bases and relentless attacks and massacres against civilians eventually led to the cities’ fall in the early months of the conflict.

Another intelligence source told Mada Masr that the RSF manages its drone operations from Um Jaras in Chad and a mobile base along the Chad-Sudan border. The source also said that RSF Deputy Commander Abdel Rahim Dagalo receives military shipments from Uganda, Somaliland and Ethiopia. These supplies are distributed based on field reports received at the RSF's operations rooms in Nyala and Jabal Awliya in Khartoum, the source added.

In Jabal Awliya, the RSF has entrenched itself in the dam area since November 2023, converting its water-flow control rooms into military operations centers, the second intelligence source said. 

RSF advisory office member Ibrahim Mokhayyar told Mada Masr that the RSF controls most of Fasher. He noted, however, that landmines planted throughout streets and alleys in civilian neighborhoods have hindered their complete control of the city.

Khater added that most Fasher residents have fled to the city’s outskirts, particularly toward the southwest. He described the food situation as dire, though no precise statistics are currently available. He noted the emergence of new shelter camps in areas such as Golo, Shagra, Shala, Saluma, and localities like Tawila, Jabal Mara, Um Kadada, Lait, and Tawisha.

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New emergency general budget amid continued war, eroding economy

Sudan’s budget for 2025 was approved on Wednesday by the transitional cabinet. 

Two economists told Mada Masr that the budget is unlikely to diverge significantly from the parameters determined for the budget in 2024, the first year in which the ongoing war shaped state expenditure.

However, they pointed out that the move to issue a new 1,000-pound banknote, announced in November by the Central Bank of Sudan, could help control the money supply, curb speculation and counterfeit funds, and stabilize the Sudanese pound.

The plan announced last month would see the new banknote replace both the existing note of the same denomination and the 500-pound note. 

The bank attributed its decision to widespread RSF-led looting of its facilities, which led to the circulation of currency of unknown origin, significantly increasing cash liquidity and driving price instability. 

Economist Awadallah Moussa told Mada Masr that the step could stabilize the exchange rate.

Speaking to Mada Masr, economic analyst Haitham Fathy also said that the currency replacement initiative would stabilize the Sudanese pound, reduce inflation, and promote financial inclusion by encouraging people to open bank accounts. He emphasized that channeling the money supply back into the banking system would reintegrate funds into the Sudanese economy.

However, Fathy said that a key challenge to this initiative would be to ensure the new currency reaches areas with ongoing security instability. He predicted that the adjustment period would need to be extended to address the issue of stolen funds still in circulation.

The state’s emergency budget, approved on Wednesday by the technical committees of ministerial sectors for fiscal year 2025,retains current levels of taxation, but increases spending on military efforts, health, education, electricity and humanitarian aid for displaced persons. It also allocates funds for supporting media institutions and expanding revenue-generating mechanisms.

A source in the Finance Ministry told Mada Masr that the budget would seek to boost public revenues by combating tax evasion, improving collection efficiency via digitization, revising trade policies at border crossings, streamlining foreign trade procedures, and reassessing customs exemptions.

The source added that the budget also capped borrowing from the banking system to the previously set limit while committing to paying federal employees’ salaries, pensioners’ dues and financing national health insurance fund services.

Moussa told Mada Masr that the upcoming budget resembles the 2024 budget, amid the war’s profound impact on Sudan’s economy and trade. These challenges, he said, have disrupted growth rates and trade balances.

The war has devastated Sudan’s economy, destroying or damaging 80 percent of its factories and industrial companies, and putting 250,000 people out of work. More than 100 bank branches were destroyed and central markets in urban areas were wiped out. The estimated losses amount to US$200 billion, including $50 billion in the industrial sector alone, according to Arab Union for Industrial Exports Development Secretary General Abdel Moneim Mohamed Mahmoud.

Despite these obstacles, Moussa noted that the Finance Ministry navigated 2023 and the current year by managing limited resources in a country at war. He pointed to successful agricultural seasons in some states, continued trade activity and the relocation of private capital to safer states, where manufacturing initiatives have already begun.

Moussa expressed optimism that the 2025 budget would build on these achievements, particularly as reconstruction efforts take shape. “2023 was the year of shock. Financial authorities managed to cope with the war in 2024, and they can also navigate 2025 by increasing military spending while resuming trade and manufacturing activities,” he said.

However, Moussa was less optimistic about the prospect of international funding for Sudan’s budget. 

Fathy, likewise, said that the Finance Ministry’s 2025 plan would likely replicate strategies from 2024, 2023, and even as far back as 2018, unless Sudan adopts a clear financial strategy with specific benchmarks for review and analysis.

He pointed out that the success of the winter agricultural season is one of the state’s most significant challenges, emphasizing the need to focus on national projects in secure areas and implement emergency plans for less stable regions to ensure participation in the season.