Sudan Nashra: Idris in Cairo as part of Egyptian-Turkish-Saudi coordination to prop up Sudanese military, Egyptian official says | RSF seizes Musa Hilal stronghold, stoking tribal tensions | RSF attacks North Darfur border town, engages Chadian forces | Hemedti in Uganda as head of parallel govt

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A week of heavy clashes in North Darfur has strained the region’s tribal landscape, threatening deeper rifts even as cross-border tribal networks move toward closer coordination to confront the violence.

Along Sudan’s western border with Chad, in Zaghawa tribe territory, the Rapid Support Forces launched an assault Saturday on the border town of Tina — one of the few remaining military-held positions in Darfur. The fighting spilled across the border, as RSF fighters engaged Chadian forces, killing five soldiers. Chad responded by closing its border and suspending the movement of people and goods until further notice.

Zaghawa communities on both sides of the border have mobilized to protect extended families and local populations amid repeated attacks from the RSF. A Zaghawa elder in N’Djamena told Mada Masr that local leaders are urging cooperation with Chadian security agencies to protect the border and prevent further incursions. Clashes are ongoing on Tina’s outskirts, a field source with the military-allied joint force said.

Farther south, just two days after the Tina attack, the RSF stormed and seized Mostariha, the stronghold of Musa Hilal — the military-allied leader of the Mahamid tribe and head of the Revolutionary Awakening Council armed group. The takeover followed weeks of escalating tensions between Hilal and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo and his brother and deputy commander Abdel Rahim.

Dozens were killed, including Hilal’s son, Haidar, and hundreds were displaced, according to local and military sources. Hilal, who fled the town, resurfaced on Wednesday at a gathering of Mahamid leaders and fighters in northwestern Darfur, and is preparing to try to retake Mostariha, a Mahamid source said.

Anwar Ahmed Khater, the head of the Mahamid coordination body, told Mada Masr that members of the Mahariya tribe — to which the Dagalo family belongs — carried out the assault alongside the RSF. He framed the confrontation as a direct clash between the Awlad Mansour clan of the Mahariya, led by the Dagalos, and the Mahamid, both of which are branches of the Rizeigat tribe.

Speaking to Mada Masr, a former military officer anticipated closer coordination in the wake of the attack between Hilal’s forces, the military and the joint force of armed movements.

These tribal clashes and mounting civilian casualties come as the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan concluded that events in and around Fasher during the RSF takeover in late October bear the “hallmarks of genocide,” citing systematic targeting of non-Arab communities, particularly the Zaghawa and Fur tribes.

In eastern Sudan, a political maneuver by Transitional Sovereignty Council Chair Abdel Fattah al-Burhan this week has also stirred concerns about further divides. Speaking at a community iftar in Omdurman on Friday, Burhan floated the possibility of forming the long-delayed legislative council from what he described as the “December bloc” — a reference, two political sources told Mada Masr, to segments of the 2018 revolutionary youth and resistance committees that have aligned with the military during the war.

According to the sources, the gesture appears designed to allay international concerns about the resurgence of figures tied to the former regime. At home, it aimed to undercut opposition civilian forces while signaling that the council could be formed without the participation of traditional military-allied political actors.

Yet what Burhan called the December bloc is not the only group outside formal politics that has backed the military. Popular resistance forces and other groups that emerged in eastern and central Sudan after the outbreak of the war would reject a legislative council formed without them, a former government advisor said. Three leaders within the groups formed in the wake of the war’s outbreak warned that such a move, if carried through without their inclusion, could deepen perceptions of marginalization and potentially prompt calls for independent political organizing, or even separation from Khartoum.

The legislative council has been on Khartoum’s agenda for weeks, as it sought to complete the formation of transitional institutions in order to strengthen its case for reinstatement in the African Union. But the effort didn’t bear fruit, as sources in the continental body previously told Mada Masr that the AU considers a ceasefire agreement and the launch of a credible political process key prerequisites for lifting Sudan’s suspension. 

Hemedti appeared to leverage these tensions to present himself as a head of state, attempting to open channels with the AU, two sources told Mada Masr. On Friday, he traveled to Uganda — an influential AU member — at the head of a senior delegation from the RSF-led Tasis alliance, marking his first public appearance abroad since he was sworn in in August as the head of the presidential council of the Tasis-led government formed in western Sudan. 

Hemedti said the visit aimed to discuss a “Ugandan vision” to end the war with President Yoweri Museveni, but the sources said no new political initiative was introduced, describing the trip as a mere attempt to confer legitimacy on Tasis.

Khartoum condemned Kampala’s reception of Hemedti, calling it an unprecedented move and expressed concern over whether the visit signals a shift in its policy toward Sudan.

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RSF seizes stronghold of military-allied Mahamid leader

Part of the destruction caused by the RSF attack on the town of Mostariha, North Darfur, February 16. Source: @samaaalsudan/Telegram.

In a deadly operation that risks pushing Darfur toward broader tribal confrontation, the RSF seized control on Monday of the North Darfur town of Mostariha, the stronghold of Musa Hilal, the military-allied leader of the Mahamid tribe and head of the Revolutionary Awakening Council armed group.

The move marked the culmination of weeks of mounting tensions between Hilal and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo and his brother and deputy commander Abdel Rahim.

The operation left dozens dead and wounded — including Hilal’s sons — and displaced hundreds, according to a local source and a military source, as well as a statement from the Revolutionary Awakening Council.

Hilal, who fled Mostariha, resurfaced on Wednesday at a gathering of Mahamid leaders and fighters in a remote area of northwestern Darfur, according to a Mahamid source. The source told Mada Masr that Hilal is now preparing to try to retake Mostariha.

Tribal elders and representatives from various clan branches have been in deliberation since the RSF attack, the source said. The assault, they stressed, did not target Hilal alone but all components of the Mahamid tribe across Central and West Africa. “Hemedti and Abdel Rahim committed a historic mistake,” the source said.

Anwar Ahmed Khater, the head of the Mahamid coordination body, told Mada Masr that four drones bombed Mostariha on Sunday night, injuring four people. On Monday, members of the Mahariya tribe — to which the Dagalo family belongs — backed by RSF units, launched a multi-pronged ground assault, he said.

Local youth initially pushed back the attack and destroyed several RSF vehicles, Khater said, but reinforcements later arrived and the town was overrun.

Khater framed the confrontation as a direct clash between the Mahariya’s Awlad Mansour clan, led by the Dagalos, and the Mahamid.

The Revolutionary Awakening Council said the RSF killed 28 people, including children. Displacement continues, with 167 people missing in the aftermath.

The council said RSF fighters are deployed throughout Mostariha and that Abdel Rahim ordered the area cordoned off. It described the assault as a “genocide,” drawing parallels to 2017, when the RSF, led by Hemedti, attacked the area. At the time, Hilal — then the commander of the Border Guard forces, formed and backed by former President Omar al-Bashir — was captured and taken to Khartoum, as Bashir replaced him with Hemedti.

According to the statement, RSF fighters encircled Mostariha before storming it with 265 combat vehicles and armored carriers under the command of Hamdan Mohamed Kajek. The force was later reinforced by units from Nyala and Geneina — around 500 vehicles equipped with heavy artillery and supported by drones.

The council said the RSF killed civilians, burned homes, assaulted women and carried out widespread looting, stripping residents of all they owned.

A Mahamid notable told Mada Masr that drone strikes preceding the ground assault struck the town’s main hospital and a civilian gathering, wounding several people, including Hilal’s son Fathy. His younger son, Haidar, was later killed after being captured and shot seven times, the source said.

Videos circulated on Sudanese social media showed Haidar lying on the ground with his hands bound, his body and head marked with multiple gunshot wounds.

The town’s mayor, Abdallah Omar Abdel Naby, was also killed, along with prominent local figures Al-Tijani al-Sharif and his brother Mohamed, the source added.

Mohamed al-Mahy, Hilal’s media advisor, confirmed that Hilal is safe but declined to disclose his whereabouts. Speaking to Mada Masr, he warned that the events in Mostariha would carry broader repercussions, particularly given what he described as the RSF’s intimidation and abuse campaign against residents in the town and surrounding areas. Such actions, he said, could unify local communities and push them toward alliances with other groups, with consequences for the military balance in Darfur.

Mahy said that Hilal has long been a persistent thorn in the side of Hemedti and Abdel Rahim, who failed to sideline or co-opt him despite his detention in Khartoum for over three years and the Dagalos’ efforts to buy off leaders of local administrations.

According to Mahy, Hilal met Hemedti days before the 2023 war began. During that meeting, he said, the RSF commander sought coordination and told Hilal he had decided to become Sudan’s president. Hilal rejected the proposal and cautioned against such ambitions. When fighting broke out, Hilal publicly declared his support for the military and state institutions.

Mahy said that Hilal’s pro-military stance angered Hemedti, who responded by appointing an alternative tribal chief for the Mahamid and providing him with financial backing. Residents of Mostariha, however, rejected the move.

In the latest point of tension between the two sides, the RSF accused Hilal of dispatching a drone to East Darfur in early January that killed a prominent RSF figure from the Mahamid. Hilal refuted the allegations and defused the ensuing tensions, after which, Mahy said, Hemedti opted for a direct ground assault on him and the town.

A former military officer told Mada Masr that Mostariha lies far from military-controlled positions, which he said explains the lack of immediate ground support when the town came under attack. He anticipated closer coordination in the coming period between Hilal’s forces, the military and the joint force of armed movements.

The RSF’s decision to attack Mostariha, according to the former officer, should also be viewed in the context of Hemedti’s fears of threats to his mobilization base, which relies heavily on Arab tribes in Darfur. Hemedti, he said, has sought to present himself as the sole representative of Arab tribes while attempting to consolidate his influence over the region. However, the former officer argued that the attack on Mostariha could prove counterproductive for Hemedti, potentially reframing the fighting in Darfur in tribal terms and deepening intra-Arab divisions.

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RSF attacks North Darfur border town, engages Chadian forces; Chad closes border

Military forces say they have repelled the RSF offensive on the town of Tina, North Darfur, February 21. Source: Ana Sudani/Facebook.

As part of its ongoing push to seize the last areas in Darfur still held by the military and its allies, the RSF launched an assault on the border town of Tina, with clashes spilling across the border and drawing in Chadian forces.

Heavy fighting broke out on Saturday in the town, located along the North Darfur-Chad border in the Zaghawa tribe’s territory, after RSF units breached defensive positions in a surprise offensive. Military forces and their allied joint force of Darfuri armed movements regrouped within hours and regained control, a military source told Mada Masr.

During the clashes, some RSF fighters crossed into Chadian territory and engaged Chadian troops, leaving five soldiers dead, several injured and military vehicles destroyed, a field source in the military-allied joint force told Mada Masr.

In a statement on Saturday, the joint force said it defeated RSF units along the southeastern axis of the Tina locality after heavy ground battles, seizing 20 fully equipped combat vehicles and destroying 17. The group added that four RSF field units were eliminated and that the remaining fighters had fled.

A joint force field source told Mada Masr that back-and-forth clashes are still ongoing on the outskirts of Tina, as the RSF mobilizes reinforcements.

The Zaghawa tribe — long at odds with the Janjaweed, the RSF’s precursor — forms the core of the joint force of the Darfuri armed movements. Its lands extend across the border into Chad’s Wadi Fira region and its members represent a key constituency in the Chadian military.

On Monday, the Chadian government announced the closure of its border with Sudan until further notice, citing “repeated incursions by armed groups” and stressing that the measure aims to prevent the risk of the conflict spreading into its territory. All cross-border movement of people and goods has been suspended.

Doctors Without Borders also closed a hospital it supports in the Chadian town of Tina due to its proximity to the Sudanese border. In a statement on Tuesday, the relief organization said it transferred activities to a new facility, citing heavy fighting in the Sudanese town of Tina and deteriorating security conditions that have led to repeated attacks and displacement in border communities.

A former military officer previously told Mada Masr that the military’s presence in the border towns within Zaghawa territory poses a serious concern for the RSF. These towns sit along critical supply routes from southern Libya through eastern Chad and into Darfur. In addition, the military’s presence there forces RSF units in the region to remain on constant alert and vulnerable to targeted strikes, the former officer said.

A Zaghawa elder in Sudanese Tina told Mada Masr that the repeated assaults on the area are not merely aimed at military positions, but directly target local communities and families whose ties stretch across the border. “That is why we commend the coordination of our sons on both the Sudanese and Chadian sides in repelling these attacks that seek to destroy our communities,” he said.

He added that tribal networks have been instrumental in maintaining communication between Zaghawa communities across the border, helping mitigate the impact of fighting, monitor displacement and facilitate humanitarian assistance. Support from Chad — including water and food supplies to Zaghawa communities in Tina — is expected to continue, he said.

From N’Djamena, a Zaghawa leader told Mada Masr that communities in Chad have directly felt the war’s repercussions, particularly since the fall of Fasher. As attacks on Tina intensified, fears have grown for population centers on the Chadian side as well, he said.

“There have therefore been strong calls from local leaders to cooperate with security agencies to protect the border and prevent incursions that could threaten stability,” he said. He stressed that cross-border family and tribal ties have been central to pushing this security and social coordination forward, because “the Zaghawa in Chad understand all too well what the fallout of the war means for their extended families in Sudan’s border areas.”

The Zaghawa tribe holds significant trans-national weight, a leader in the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Darfur Governor Minni Arko Minnawi told Mada Masr. In Chad, Zaghawa figures rose to positions of power from the 1990s onward. In Darfur, the tribe formed one of the principal social bases for armed movements that emerged in the early 2000s, most notably the Sudan Liberation movements and the Justice and Equality Movement.

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PM Kamel Idris in Cairo days after Sisi’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Egyptian official: Part of Egyptian-Turkish-Saudi coordination to prop up the Sudanese military

Prime Minister Kamel Idris arrived in Cairo on Thursday, leading a senior delegation for high-level talks. He met the same day with Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbuly and President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

The visit follows close on the heels of Sisi’s trip to Jeddah on Monday, where he held talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman during what was officially described as a “brotherly visit.”

In a joint statement issued after talks with Madbuly, the Egyptian Cabinet reaffirmed Cairo’s support for the “legitimate institutions of the Sudanese state, including the Transitional Sovereignty Council headed by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the government of Kamel Idris and the Sudanese Armed Forces.”

An Egyptian official involved in shaping Cairo’s policy on Sudan told Mada Masr that the visit is part of preparations for a forthcoming Saudi-backed “mega meeting” on Sudan. 

The official described the effort as a coordinated move by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to counter growing Emirati and Israeli influence in the region. This was also confirmed by a Saudi official.

“We’ve been working on this with the Saudis for a while, and we’re making progress,” the Egyptian official said, adding that a buildup aimed at strengthening the Sudanese military could begin to show results by April or May.

According to the source, Cairo has turned to both Riyadh and Ankara despite existing differences, to “give Burhan a stronger hand.” Cooperation between the three countries is expected to intensify across the Red Sea region, the source said.

This coordination, in Sudan and across the Red Sea region, was the subject of conversation in Sisi and Bin Salman’s meeting in Jeddah on Monday, according to the Saudi official, who told Mada Masr that the two heads of state discussed plans to confront Israel’s plan for “domination at the expense of Arab states” whose influence, Emirati figures have claimed on social media, “has expired.”

“Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar — the major powers in the Middle East — will not stand idly by while the Zionist-Emirati-African threat creeps toward us,” the official said. 

Egypt and Turkey, alongside other actors, had already moved to prop up the Sudanese military and stymie the United Arab Emirates’ supply lines to the RSF after the fall of Fasher in late October. Egypt and Turkey engaged in operational coordination, while Turkish drones targeted supply routes, using Egyptian and Sudanese airbases for logistical support, an Egyptian official previously told Mada Masr.

Though the Saudi official described the coordination as strong, the Egyptian source was less confident.

Egypt is not necessarily happy with Turkish presence on its borders with Sudan and Libya, nor does it see eye to eye with the Saudis on Sudan or with the fact that “the Saudis are not coming forward with the economic assistance we need this year,” the source said. 

“[However], we still have to cooperate with the Saudis because they use their financial influence with African countries,” the source added. “And Turkish presence is essential to give Burhan a stronger hand.”

But even with this push, Egypt does not intend to move further into Sudan as it does not want to get into direct confrontations with Abu Dhabi, which has been its primary financial backer over the past decade and is expected to make major investments this year, the source said.

The continued diplomatic proximity to Abu Dhabi despite the divides between the Saudi and Emirati blocs was evident when Sisi visited the Emirati capital on February 9. According to the Egyptian official, Emirati Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed and Sisi discussed proposals to come to a powersharing agreement between RSF-aligned elements and the Sudanese military. 

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Burhan proposes legislative council drawn from “December bloc”

Speaking at a community iftar gathering in Omdurman on Friday, Transitional Sovereignty Council Chair Abdel Fattah al-Burhan floated the possibility of forming a legislative council drawn from what he described as the “December bloc.”

According to two political sources who spoke to Mada Masr, his use of the nebulous term more narrowly refers to the revolutionary youth and resistance committees that spearheaded the 2018 revolution against ousted President Omar al-Bashir — and more specifically still, those of them who have sided with the military against the RSF during the war.

In the government’s signalling to the international community, the gesture is designed to allay concerns about the reemergence of figures tied to the former regime, particularly after the appointment of Bashir’s former lawyer as justice minister and the rise of pro-military groups featuring individuals associated with the old order. At home, it functions as a warning to both opposition leaders and military-allied factions that no political actor’s position is guaranteed, the sources said.

Several sources cautioned that under current wartime realities, the move, if carried through, could deepen fractures in Sudan’s social fabric.

Darfur and parts of Kordofan under RSF control would be left out of the process, a former advisor to the 2019-2021 transitional government told Mada Masr. Moreover, popular resistance forces and other military-allied groups that emerged in eastern and central Sudan following Burhan’s call for broad mobilization would reject a legislative council formed without their participation, the source said.

Three leaders in the popular resistance forces warned that rebuilding transitional institutions without broad participation risks deepening grievances and entrenching perceptions of marginalization among groups that are left out. This could, in turn, fuel calls by social leaders in military-allied groups for independent political organizing, and even separation from the center, they said.

The December revolution, they stressed, cannot be reduced to a single political bloc or repurposed to legitimize transitional arrangements that fall short of its core demand for full civilian rule.

Yet the two political sources say the maneuver is not about ensuring the broad representation of revolutionary youth in the first place.

A political source in the Democratic Bloc argued that by courting resistance committees and ushering them into formal politics, Burhan is also trying to pull the rug from under the opposition Sumud coalition, led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, which casts itself as the standard-bearer of the December revolution’s demands. In doing so, the source said, Burhan seeks to erode civilian forces’ claims to revolutionary legitimacy, while offering resistance youth the political recognition they were denied during the 2019-2021 transitional government, which ended with the coup led by Burhan and Hemedti against its civilian component.

But the message, a political source in Idris’s office said, also targets the Democratic Bloc itself — the main military-allied coalition originally tasked with nominating candidates for the long-delayed legislative council. Burhan has recently expressed frustration with the bloc’s performance, a source close to him previously told Mada Masr, accusing it of failing to “strengthen the state’s legitimacy.”

According to the source in Idris’s office, Burhan is signalling that he could sideline established political actors from the legislative council, which would also serve to counter narratives that the transition was captured by specific political factions.

A former member of the 2005-2010 transitional Parliament argued that the move amounts to an attempt to monopolize the symbolism of the revolution — elevating select forces who have sided with the military during the war as its authentic representatives while sidelining civilian actors opposed to continued military dominance over political decision-making. In the source’s assessment, the initiative merely reflects a search for a political base capable of shoring up internal legitimacy against both civilian and military rivals.

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Hemedti in Uganda with Tasis delegation

With Sudan still suspended from the African Union after member states failed to agree on its reinstatement at the bloc’s 39th summit in mid-February, Hemedti traveled to Uganda on Friday at the head of a senior delegation from the RSF-led Tasis alliance.

The visit marks his first public appearance abroad since he was sworn in in August as the head of the presidential council of the Tasis-led government formed in western Sudan. 

According to a researcher and a political source speaking to Mada Masr, Hemedti capitalized on the moment to present himself in Uganda — an influential AU member — as a head of state.

In Entebbe, he held talks with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni on what he described as a “Ugandan vision” to end the war.

Museveni stated on X that he received Hemedti, who he said briefed him on the current situation in Sudan. “As always,” he wrote, “I emphasized that dialogue and a peaceful political solution are the only sustainable paths to stability for Sudan and the region.”

Addressing members of the Sudanese community in Entebbe on Sunday, Hemedti said the visit came at Museveni’s invitation, adding that Sudanese authorities had approached the Ugandan president to help mediate a settlement.

“From the first day of the war we said negotiations should be African — peace should be achieved in Africa, through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union,” Hemedti said. He added that the RSF seeks “real peace, not like the peace of the Juba Agreement, nor that of the Naivasha agreement, which divided the country.”

With the trip coming days after Sudan’s AU reinstatement bid was stalled, Fouad Othman, a researcher on the Horn of Africa, told Mada Masr that Hemedti — flanked by a Tasis delegation — wanted to bolster his standing vis-a-vis Burhan.

Ammar Amum, the Tasis government’s foreign minister, told Mada Masr that the Uganda trip was “successful,” notwithstanding “the AU’s refusal to recognize a parallel government.” Pointing to Kampala’s weight within the bloc, Amum maintained that his government represents Sudan, while describing the government in Port Sudan as illegitimate, citing the suspension from the AU.

Imam al-Hilu, the head of the Policy and Peace Affairs Committee of the National Umma Party, likewise described the trip as a bid to confer legitimacy on Tasis but said no new political initiative was introduced.

According to Hilu, Hemedti’s speech on Sunday was “weak” and focused largely on anti-Islamist rhetoric without articulating a clear vision for state institutions or transitional arrangements. The visit, he argued, yielded no tangible breakthrough and fit within Uganda’s broader mediation efforts.

In Entebbe, Hemedti repeatedly accused Burhan of taking direction from Islamists tied to the former regime, voicing support for United States President Donald Trump’s peace initiative, saying Trump’s stance against Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood would “solve our problems.”

Hemedti said that some countries involved in mediation had continued to “maneuver,” but were now confined to the US-led Quad platform — comprising the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia — after failing to find other avenues for influence. He attacked Saudi Arabia and the 2023  Jeddah process, saying the RSF did not reject the terms of the Jeddah Agreement — which includes vacating occupied public and private facilities — but realized, after a year of war, that the Saudis had only intervened to empower Burhan.

Othman said that while Dagalo’s remarks included direct messages to Saudi Arabia, they also carried indirect attacks against a neighboring state understood to be Egypt, accusing it of interfering in support of Burhan and his military.

“[The Burhan-led bloc] believes that with the military support they are receiving now, they will win and return to power. But they are wrong,” Hemedti said.

He maintained that certain countries he did not name were backing the military with mercenaries, while denying accusations that the RSF employs foreign fighters. “They said we have Colombian mercenaries. We got ten technical experts for drones. Not mercenaries,” he said.

The Sudanese government condemned Uganda’s reception of the RSF commander. In a statement on Sunday, the Foreign Ministry denounced the meeting between Hemedti and Museveni, calling it an unprecedented move. While emphasizing that Sudan respects Uganda’s sovereign right to determine whom it receives on its territory and to manage bilateral relations according to its own interests, the statement expressed “deep concern” over whether the visit signals a shift in Kampala’s policy toward Sudan.

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Fact-finding mission finds ‘hallmarks of genocide’ in Fasher’s assault, US sanctions RSF commanders implicated

The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan concluded that events in and around Fasher during the RSF takeover in late October bear the “hallmarks of genocide.”

In its February 19 report, the mission found that the RSF had orchestrated a systematic campaign against non-Arab communities — particularly the Zaghawa and Fur tribes — in and around the city. Investigators documented evidence of at least three acts of genocide: the killing of members of a protected ethnic group, the infliction of serious bodily or mental harm, and the deliberate creation of life-threatening conditions aimed at destroying the group, in whole or in part. Under international law, any one of these acts can suffice to establish that the crime of genocide had occured.

By the time the RSF launched its final assault, the report said, Fasher had already endured 18 months of siege. Residents were left “physically exhausted, malnourished and in part unable to flee” — conditions that rendered them defenseless during the three-day takeover, when thousands, particularly among the Zaghawa, were killed, raped or forcibly disappeared, according to the report.

“The conduct in Fasher is an aggravation of earlier patterns of mirror attacks against other non-Arab communities elsewhere in Sudan, but on a far more lethal scale,” the mission said. It noted that earlier warnings about the risk of atrocities in the city did not yield concrete results in protecting civilians. With the same operational patterns unfolding in Kordofan, the mission urged the international community to act decisively to prevent further atrocities and hold the perpetrators accountable.

Weeks before the city’s fall, the investigative body’s mandate was renewed for another year after the mission itself and international human rights groups persistently urged the UN Human Rights Council to keep the investigation open to ensure accountability.

On November 14, the UNHRC convened a special session on Fasher and adopted a resolution calling on the fact-finding mission to launch an urgent probe into violations committed during the RSF’s assault.

On the day the report was released, the US Treasury Department announced a new round of sanctions on three field commanders in the paramilitary, citing their role in the siege and takeover of Fasher, “in which the RSF perpetrated a horrific campaign of ethnic killings, torture, starvation and sexual violence.”

Those designated include Gedo Hamdan Ahmed Mohamed, known as “Abu Shouk,” the commander of the North Darfur sector since 2021, and Tijani Ibrahim Moussa Mohamed, known as “Al-Zeir Salem.” Also listed is the infamous Abu Lulu, or Al-Fateh Abdallah Idris Adam, who had filmed himself executing civilians during the takeover and boasted of killing thousands.

Since the early months of the war, Washington has steadily imposed sanctions against both the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces, from battlefield commanders and procurement networks to the very top of the chain of command, including the military’s commander-in-chief, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo and his deputy and brother Abdel Rahim. In early January, the US determined that the RSF had committed genocide in Darfur during the ongoing war.

A media source in the office of Darfur regional governor Minni Arko Minnawi told Mada Masr that Minnawi considers the latest sanctions “insufficient,” calling instead for accountability to be extended to Hemedti and Abdel Rahim as those ultimately responsible for issuing orders during the takeover, akin to the approach taken by the International Criminal Court in the case against former president Omar al-Bashir and other senior officials for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur in 2003.

According to the source, such impunity is reflected on the ground, as the RSF continues incursions into Zaghawa areas, committing violations against its members. Fasher and its surroundings still face severe humanitarian challenges, as displaced people suffer in temporary camps amid shortages of food, medicine and basic services, compounded by fears of renewed abuses within the camps themselves, the source said.

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