Sudan Nashra: Sudan downplays GERD-caused floods to avoid diplomatic row | AU-led Sudanese-Sudanese meetings postponed | Military breaks aerial blockade over Fasher | Over 80 killed in military airstrikes on Nyala | Machar trial kicks off, immunity pushed aside

As Sudan grappled last week with devastating floods, its government sought to contain the crisis quietly, avoiding open confrontation with Ethiopia even as Cairo and Addis Ababa engaged in a war of words over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Treading carefully, Khartoum hopes to preserve room for a diplomatic track on transborder coordination on the dam’s operations.

On the ground, farmers in the hardest-hit areas described to Mada Masr a sudden and unanticipated surge in water that swept through their lands, destroying crops. One farmer said the losses would take at least one or two years to recover from.

The dam issue featured in talks on Wednesday between Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Atty and both Transitional Sovereignty Council Chair Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Prime Minister Kamel Idris in Port Sudan. Ethiopia increasingly views Sudan as leaning toward Cairo’s position on the GERD, but Khartoum is trying to keep tensions low. Speaking to the press on Wednesday, Idris stressed the cooperative relations linking the three countries and Sudan’s keenness to prevent any future harm.

The Sudan-Egypt talks also delved into other pressing diplomatic challenges, including Sudan’s efforts to lift its suspension from the African Union. In his address to the press in Port Sudan, Idris said Sudan’s long-sought return to the continental body was only a “matter of time,” citing assurances from the AU Commission chair during the UN General Assembly. But that time may not be as soon as anticipated.

An AU-curated Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue aimed at reconciling Sudan’s parallel administrations has been postponed, an AU source and an Egyptian official told Mada Masr. Both the military and RSF-led governments were invited to pave a path toward a new joint transitional administration. But with both sides unable to exert leverage on the ground in Sudan, the two sides are too far apart to hold any discussions on a transitional, unified government or break the impasse that continues to dominate the political process.

That fact defines Khartoum’s approach to nearly all the stalemates it faces, even as international pressure mounts amid a worsening humanitarian crisis, particularly in Darfur.

North Darfur’s Fasher has become the epicenter of this complex crisis, where besieged residents face famine conditions. Despite the surge in international engagement, Khartoum continues to reject any process that could grant legitimacy to the RSF, while the paramilitary group seeks to use the humanitarian crisis as leverage to gain recognition.

While Burhan is attempting to pursue diplomatic tracks that minimize concessions, he is also working to facilitate airdrop operations to alleviate the crisis and with it the pressure on his government and military — without ceding control of Fasher, his most critical military and political card.

The city has been under both ground and aerial siege for months. This week, however, the military managed to break the aerial blockade with its first airdrop operation in five months, delivering supplies to its division inside the city. The breakthrough was coupled with a large-scale offensive targeting RSF air defense systems, extending as far as Nyala, the RSF’s main stronghold and seat of its parallel administration.

For the military, the return of airstrikes would make the notion of safe, fortified RSF-controlled areas suitable to host a parallel government untenable, a senior military officer told Mada Masr. But the escalated campaign came at a severe cost for civilians: dozens were killed in Zurug in North Darfur and over 80 in Nyala, according to an RSF source and the RSF-led Tasis.

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Sudan scrambles to contain flood crisis as GERD disputes flare

Water levels of the Nile and its tributaries reached flood stage in major states outside the usual season as Sudan’s dams — and government — were unprepared to absorb the abrupt surge.

The floodwaters coincided with water releases from Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), magnifying the surge downstream and triggering floods in the Blue Nile, White Nile, Gezira, Sennar, River Nile and Khartoum states.

As Egyptian media amplified the scale of the floods, Cairo launched a new war of words against Addis Ababa, accusing Ethiopia of “irresponsible and unilateral management” of the GERD. In contrast, Sudan’s government has sought to quietly manage the crisis on the ground, sources tell Mada Masr.

For Khartoum, the challenge is twofold — mitigating the immediate impact of the disaster while keeping it from spiraling into a diplomatic confrontation. The government has sought to contain the humanitarian and media impact of the floods in order to steer the conversation with Ethiopia into a diplomatic track in light of the continued absence of an agreement on coordinating the GERD’s operation and filling, which has been a source of diplomatic tension between the three countries. This comes as Addis Ababa views Sudan’s position on the GERD as increasingly tilting toward Cairo's, particularly after the joint statement signed by the two in Cairo in September.

But on the ground, the scale of the damage is telling. Farmers along the Blue Nile reported catastrophic losses after about 750 million cubic meters of water per day surged toward the Roseires Dam in Blue Nile State, 90 kilometers downstream from the GERD.

The intense discharge, which continued to be released from the GERD for three days from the morning of September 24 to the evening of September 26, unleashed severe flooding along the Blue Nile and Nile River, inundating wide stretches of farmland and residential areas.

A late-season and unusually heavy rainfall over the Ethiopian plateau coincided with the completion of water filling at the GERD reservoir. Ethiopia began releasing water from the dam, so it merged with peak floodwaters in a sudden rush that placed pressure on Sudan’s unprepared dams. The timing and volume proved disastrous: reservoirs in Sudan remained sealed after a relatively light rainfall in September and Ethiopia’s filling operation, leaving little capacity to absorb the inflow once the surge began.

The government’s emergency response has focused on reinforcing riverbanks with earth barriers, while civil defense teams under the Interior Ministry carry out evacuations and infilling operations in Khartoum, Nile River and Gezira states.

Residents of Wad Ramli, north of Khartoum, told Mada Masr that the government carried out large-scale evacuations in recent days, relocating hundreds of families. Concerns are mounting over worsening humanitarian and health conditions, particularly the spread of waterborne and mosquito-borne diseases such as malaria, amid the country’s broader epidemic crisis.

In Blue Nile State, the hardest hit, farmers along the river described a sudden surge of water that swept through their lands for several days, submerging fields and destroying crops across wide areas.

In Geissan locality, farmer Abdeen Mohamed told Mada Masr that his 60-feddan farm along the river was completely inundated for three consecutive days. Most areas along the Blue Nile’s banks were heavily affected by the sudden influx, he said.

According to Abdeen, this year’s flooding was unaccounted for — it was different: the waters rose rapidly and spread across wide areas in a short time. Floodwaters swept through Geissan, engulfing farmland and some residential areas and forcing residents to evacuate their livestock and valuables.

In Sennar State, farmer Ali Osman said floodwaters in his area were the highest in nearly two decades, particularly in Gharsaly. Most of eastern Sennar’s farmlands, he said, suffered severe damage. Osman said that recovery from this year’s losses could take at least one or two years.

In Gezira State, which also lies along the Blue Nile, large stretches of riverbanks were flooded in a short span of time, farmer Fekki Awad from the Hasahisa locality told Mada Masr.

Awad said farmers had no time to build protective embankments around their lands, as the floodwaters rose too quickly and the government’s warning came too late. Losses, he added, are estimated in the millions of pounds, with most farmers losing nearly all of their crops. “The situation after this flood will be extremely difficult,” he said, “especially since many of us were already displaced by the war in Sennar and have no money to recover.”

The Agriculture and Irrigation Ministry said “early warnings” had been issued about the heavy rainfall expected over the Ethiopian plateau — the source of the Blue Nile and Atbara rivers — where precipitation exceeded seasonal averages. The warning was issued on September 27.

According to a former ministerial official, the Agriculture Ministry is currently pursuing two parallel tracks: first, addressing the consequences of the large water inflows, and, second, working to design an operational mechanism that ensures coordinated management between Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt. 

In its statements, the government has placed greater emphasis on the effects of climate change — which indeed played a part — but the former official said it has downplayed the core issue: the lack of coordination in the dam’s operation.

The former official added that the government sees no viable solution to the crisis other than negotiation and coordination among the three countries, and is thus trying to avoid entering a diplomatic confrontation that could impede such efforts.

The Ethiopian side, the official said, proceeded with filling the dam’s reservoir at a time when forecasts indicated that rainfall would intensify toward the end of September and early October — a period during which Sudan’s reservoirs are typically kept at their lowest levels. Heavy rains thus coincided with a significant rise in the GERD reservoir’s water level. When Ethiopia opened the dam’s spillway gates without prior coordination, massive volumes of water were suddenly released downstream.

Prime Minister Kamal Idris reaffirmed on Wednesday his government’s commitment to the Nile waters and GERD issues, stressing that Khartoum is closely monitoring developments. Sudan, he said, is coordinating with both Egypt and Ethiopia on the matter to safeguard shared interests.

Speaking to reporters upon his arrival in Port Sudan from New York — where he had attended the UN General Assembly — Idris said that Sudan would conduct an in-depth study and detailed review of the GERD file in coordination with Egypt and Ethiopia. He highlighted the cooperative relations linking the three countries and Sudan’s keenness to prevent any future harm.

The GERD issue also featured in talks held in Port Sudan between Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Atty and Transitional Sovereignty Council Chair Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Idris. The two sides stressed their united stance as downstream states of the Nile, underscoring the need for full adherence to international law and rejecting unilateral measures on the river.

Although flows along the Blue Nile have recently begun to recede, with levels expected to gradually decline, Sudan remains on high alert amid growing calls for effective coordination with Ethiopia to manage future water releases.

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Military breaks aerial siege on Fasher, airdrops military supplies

The military broke the aerial siege on North Darfur’s Fasher, ending more than five months of RSF control over the city’s skies.

At 4:22 am on Monday, three warplanes flew over Fasher and carried out an airdrop operation — the first since April 2025, when an RSF strike brought down a military aircraft. The drop lasted nearly two hours, according to three military sources from the western command who spoke to Mada Masr.

Supplies — including weapons, ammunition and advanced equipment — were delivered to the Sixth Infantry Division, which has been trapped in the city since April 2024 and subjected to over 250 RSF attacks, military sources and eyewitnesses in the city said.

The RSF seized control of Fasher’s airspace after downing an Ilyushin transport aircraft during an airdrop mission in April. Since then, the military has been unable to resupply its forces, which the military sources said allowed RSF fighters to push deeper into Fasher’s neighborhoods and tighten their grip on nearly the entire perimeter of the city.

Control was further cemented by trenches and barriers. Three-meter-deep trenches cut off roads to Malit, Tawila and Nyala, a Fasher resident told Mada Masr in September. In late August, Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab said satellite images showed 31 kilometers of berms around the city. That number has since more than doubled, with sand barriers now stretching over 68 kilometers, leaving an opening of only three to four kilometers, according to a UN report this week. A military officer described the RSF’s strategy as an attempt to build a security zone around Fasher.

The RSF has also set up jamming towers in several locations around Fasher and along the eastern road connecting the city to Obeid in a bid to disrupt military aircraft and shield its troops and artillery positions, according to a senior military source in the General Staff.

Ahead of Monday’s airdrop, the military launched a series of precision airstrikes on RSF positions to the city’s east and north. These strikes continued into Tuesday, eyewitnesses said.

Three advanced air defense platforms — in Gorani in the north, Zamzam camp to the south and Gaggo Gaggo to the east — were destroyed in the attacks, according to a source in the military’s forward command in Obeid and a military source in the joint force.

Each mobile system can target both aircraft and drones within a 25-kilometer radius at high altitudes and is equipped with radar as well as optical and thermal sensors, according to the source in the Obeid command.

A source in the Air Force told Mada Masr that Monday’s mission over Fasher was “extremely risky,” as there were concerns the RSF still had a hidden air defense platform.

Following the airdrop operation, heavy clashes broke out across Fasher on Wednesday. A military source told Mada Masr that the armed forces ambushed an RSF unit that infiltrated residential areas, killing several foreign fighters, who the source said were Colombians and Ukrainians. On the same day, a military drone struck an RSF gathering in the Karkar area to the east, killing several commanders, according to the source.

The RSF attempted to bring in a new jamming system from South Darfur’s Nyala, but the military destroyed it in the Shangal Tobay area, the source said. Several other RSF positions around the city were also struck on the same day.

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Tasis: Over 80 civilians killed as military escalates airstrikes on Nyala

The military expanded its aerial campaign to Nyala, the capital of South Darfur and the headquarters of the paramilitary group’s parallel government, with the civilian toll mounting amid the escalation.

A field source in the military intelligence said the Air Force carried out a precision strike that hit an air defense system in the Domaya camp to the west on Thursday, killing and wounding dozens.

Other sites across Darfur were struck on the same day, including a training camp housing around 3,000 RSF fighters in the Bolbol area west of Nyala, which the source said killed dozens. Some of the strikes hit positions in Zurug and the cities of Malha and Malit in North Darfur.

Dozens of civilians were killed in Zurug when a military drone struck a crowded market, an RSF field source told Mada Masr.

The RSF-led Tasis coalition stated on Thursday that 83 civilians were killed while attending a social event after a military drone struck near the Bolbol Timbisko area west of Nyala.

The statement condemned what it described as a “brutal attack” and “part of a campaign of genocide and ethnic cleansing by the terrorist military” against civilians in areas without RSF presence.

But for the military, the return of airstrikes would make the notion of safe, fortified RSF-controlled areas suitable to host a parallel government untenable, a senior military officer told Mada Masr. The aerial bombardments along with the resumption of supply flights, according to the officer, would also affect the course of the fighting and alter the balance on the ground — especially, they said, if the military continues to make territorial gains in Kordofan.

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PM: AU return 'matter of time,’ even as body postpones Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue 

The question of Sudan’s return to the African Union will be delayed, even as Prime Minister Kamel Idris said last week that it is “only a matter of time” before the long-sought goal since the October 2021 coup comes to fruition.

Idris made the comments at a press conference in Port Sudan on Wednesday, where he noted that Sudan’s delegation to the UNGA reached understandings with African Union Commission Chair Mahmoud Ali Youssouf and several world leaders on the sidelines regarding Sudan’s reinstatement.

The AU was meant to hold a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue conference in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa on October 6. The meeting aimed to take steps toward ending the war and creating a new transitional government to replace Sudan’s parallel governments, an AU source told Mada Masr, adding that invitations were extended to both the RSF and military-led governments.

However, the conference was postponed due to requests from political forces within Sudan for further consultations, according to a political source in Port Sudan.

An Egyptian official confirmed the postponement, saying that all concerned countries agreed to postpone the meeting as the two sides are still too far apart. Neither the military nor the RSF has the leverage necessary to steer the talks in either direction, the source added.

Political positions regarding participation in the conference varied. The Sumud alliance, led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, preferred to invite all parties, including the Tasis alliance, whose members declared the parallel “Peace Government” based in Nyala. Other political forces within Sudan refused to participate, led by the National Movement, which includes a group of political forces led by Tijani al-Sisi, a key figure in Darfur. The Democratic Bloc, led by Minni Arko Minawi, criticized the African Union's method of arranging the meeting but did not object to participating. The Peace Government itself issued a statement on September 22 saying it would not participate in what it called biased meetings.

According to the AU source, “the whole purpose of the meeting is to create a common ground to allow for the creation of a new transitional government made up of members from both sides.”

However, the AU source acknowledged that creating such a joint government will be hard.

Sudan’s push to be reinstated into the AU has repeatedly run into resistance, particularly from the United Arab Emirates, an AU observer state and ally to major African actors, including Kenya. A TSC source said that Abu Dhabi has used its influence within the regional body to press for political conditions that strip the government of legitimacy.

On the other side, the government in Khartoum has repeatedly refused to partake in any diplomatic process that would cede its ground as the sole legitimate government in Sudan, despite it coming to power in a 2021 coup that ousted the civilian component of the transitional government before the military-RSF coup government ultimately turned on itself.

If efforts to form a unified government fail, the AU source told Mada Masr, “it will be the government that manages to accommodate the demands of the AU and the African commission that will take the seat of Sudan in the union.”

The AU’s demands include: internationally monitored elections and a new constitution that is voted on.

The military-led government has not been keen to even pay lip service to these demands in the past. In August 2023, Burhan issued a decree placing the military-led Transitional Sovereignty Council in charge of ministries. The AU then refused to work with the transitional government, viewing it as an extension of the post-coup order, a Foreign Ministry source told Mada Masr at the time.

But now, the appointment of Idris and the formation of a civilian government — even if plagued by military-intervention — has been designed to appease criticism from the AU and elsewhere that Sudan’s government is non-democratic and military-led.

This is not something that the AU source thinks the RSF-led government is prepared to do.

“It is highly unlikely that Hemedti will do what the African Union will require,” the source said. “Hemedti doesn’t want to be associated with very specific constitutional steps.”

Also working in the military-led government’s favor, according to the source, is support from the main political brokers in the AU — Algeria, Egypt, South Africa and Senegal — all of whom prefer Burhan over Hemedti, as well as similar preference among some members of the United Nations Security Council.

But the AU hasn’t given up on direct negotiations first. On the sidelines of the UNGA, representatives of the AU, the European Union, France, Germany and the United Kingdom convened a ministerial meeting with regional and international stakeholders to discuss the war in Sudan. The statement issued following the meeting urged the warring parties to resume direct negotiations to achieve a permanent ceasefire.

The push for inclusivity has also come from the Egypt-UAE-Saudi Arabia-US Quad, which issued a roadmap for peace in early September after months of backdoor politicking. 

The roadmap presents a sequenced process. First, there will be a humanitarian truce for an initial three month period, followed by an “inclusive and transparent” political process within nine months that will move Sudan toward “an independent, civilian-led government with broad-based legitimacy and accountability.”

The Quad met during the UNGA but tensions within the four-state group led to the postponement of a final statement. A source in Sudan’s Foreign Ministry and its permanent mission to the UN attributed the postponement to objections raised by the UAE pertaining to the status of the RSF, insisting the group be recognized as a de facto authority. However, the rest of the group’s members — the US, Saudi Arabia and Egypt — rejected conferring any form of legitimacy on the RSF government.

Khartoum staunchly rejected the Quad’s roadmap as it clashes with its pursuit of a military resolution, its newly formed transitional government and its insistence that Abu Dhabi halt support for the RSF before engaging with the group.

Nonetheless, the AU is engaging with the Quad’s lead. Party leaders invited to the AU talks told Mada Masr that the agenda revolves around the September roadmap. During his meeting with Youssouf on the sidelines of the UNGA, Idris said his government would integrate the dialogue’s outcomes insofar as they align with its own roadmap, a Foreign Ministry source told Mada Masr last week.

But amid this stalemate, there is a growing risk of Sudan’s full partition, given the announcement of the parallel government by the RSF and SPLM-North.

An Egyptian diplomat informed of deliberations within the AU pointed to the fear of the partition of Sudan as a major driving force within internal negotiations.

“All African states are afraid of opening the door to the division of Sudan, which Hemedti represents,” the diplomat told Mada Masr. “This is the case especially for countries in East Africa, who fear the division of Sudan would lead to a prolonged war with spillover effects into their countries.” 

When asked about countries specifically supporting the RSF, such as Kenya, which hosted the conference announcing the Peace Government, the diplomat noted that they are supporting them insofar as they want to endorse the RSF as a partner in the government of Sudan.

“They want the RSF to be included, but they don’t want Sudan to be divided,” the diplomat underlined.

According to the diplomat, Egypt is pushing hard to create a consensus within the AU’s peace and security council to recommend the reinstatement of the government in Khartoum to the seat of Sudan.

A Cabinet Affairs Ministry source said the Khartoum government is optimistic this time about the AU’s steps toward lifting Sudan’s suspension. Idris’s engagements at the UNGA are expected to yield results, but the source acknowledged that strong opposition remains — above all from the UAE. Diplomatic sources told Mada Masr last week, during Idris’s visit to New York, that Khartoum received promises from the African Union Commission chair that the suspension would be lifted.

The military gained the upper hand in the war at the end of 2024, which has buoyed its position at the bargaining table. A source in the Sovereignty Council told Mada Masr that, at the time, Burhan adopted two approaches that helped facilitate the change in tide: the first was to push and secure a path to regain control of strategic and important states, and the second was a diplomatic approach, minimizing international resolutions that would place the state and government in a position of violating any protocol or becoming embroiled in any complications that would affect their future status.

With the military shifting from defense to offense in September 2024, recapturing vast areas in central Sudan and then approaching full control of Khartoum, Burhan visited five African countries in early 2025 to seek to lift the freeze within the African Union.

The source said that Burhan continued to send messages to the African Union, while Sovereignty Council Vice Chairman Malik Agar launched a fierce attack on the UAE, an observer member of the Union, accusing it of planning to hold a conference on Sudan on the sidelines of the African Union meetings in February with the aim of obstructing efforts to resolve the Sudanese crisis.

According to a former Foreign Ministry source, Egypt also provided extensive diplomatic assistance within the African Union and the African Peace and Security Council, categorically rejecting any attempts to recognize, accept, or even hint at a unified government formation.

Today, however, the military remains bogged down in its push through the Kordofan states and the situation in Fasher remains dire. Absent a military breakthrough or an agreement to negotiate for a unified government, the threat of partition continues to loom over Sudan, leaving the AU to decide how to engage with the reality of a deadlocked Sudan.

The AU suspended Sudan from all activities in the body in October 2021 after the RSF and the military jointly ousted the civilian wing of the government. The AU said at the time that it "strongly condemns the seizure of power," branding it "unconstitutional,” and added that Sudan’s suspension would continue "until the effective restoration of the civilian-led transitional authority."

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TSC discusses approach to Quad roadmap with Egyptian FM amid mounting pressure over humanitarian aid access

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Atty held separate meetings in Port Sudan on Wednesday with Transitional Sovereignty Council Chair Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Prime Minister Kamel Idris.

The visit comes amid mounting challenges for the government — from navigating the GERD dispute in the wake of the recent floods, to seeking to lift its suspension from the African Union and maneuvering the US-led Quad roadmap.

A Sudanese Foreign Ministry source said Abdel Atty discussed Khartoum’s position toward the Quad with Burhan and his counterpart, Mohie Eddin Salem. According to the source, Salem briefed Abdel Atty on the government’s approach to the issue, which the source said rests on three simultaneous tracks.

The first is Sudan’s return to the AU, which it believes would prevent the UAE — a member of the Quad and a war-long adversary to Khartoum — from advancing its agenda through the group, as AU commitments would bar any single external actor from conducting unilateral talks with the government.

The source said the Sudanese foreign minister commended Egypt’s position as a member within the Quad, noting Cairo’s consistent refusal to recognize the RSF’s parallel administration. Egypt’s stance, he said, has been particularly crucial in rejecting any attempt to equate the Sudanese Armed Forces with the RSF.

The second track, according to the source, concerns humanitarian aid. The government, Salem said, believes that the international community, including European countries and the United States, has prioritized discussing aid delivery before securing adequate funding, turning the issue instead into a political bargaining tool. Sudan’s position, he added, is that humanitarian matters must remain completely separate from political negotiations over the crisis.

The third track, the source continued, pertains to the legitimacy of Sudan’s state institutions — foremost among them the transitional bodies. The foreign minister stressed that any attempt to strip or overlook that legitimacy, while seeking to impose the RSF as a de facto authority, is unacceptable. The military, Salem added, is currently working to lift the siege on western regions, predicting that the balance of control in Darfur “will shift within six months.”

The three tracks are, however, interdependent. Pressure on Khartoum has been mounting over humanitarian access to North Darfur’s Fasher, and all eyes are now on how the government navigates the Quad initiative — a process it initially met with firm rejection but has since seen Khartoum soften its stance. A source in the Foreign Ministry and its permanent mission to the UN told Mada Masr that the ministry reached out to the American, Saudi and Egyptian sides to clarify its position on the proposal.

North Darfur’s Fasher has become the epicenter of this complex crisis — where the urgent need to deliver life-saving aid to besieged civilians in famine conditions collides with the military-led government’s refusal to let relief operations become a tool for legitimizing the RSF and its parallel government in Darfur.

Food supplies in Fasher have collapsed to the point of near-total scarcity, forcing residents to survive on animal fodder for months, which itself has become increasingly scarce, while civilians endure relentless bombardment and the RSF’s campaign to empty the city of its residents.

Humanitarian aid has become a central theme in Burhan and Darfur governor Minni Arko Minawi’s diplomatic engagements, as well as a focal point of international initiatives since the UN general secretary's humanitarian ceasefire proposal in June — accepted by Burhan but rejected by the RSF.

The government accuses the RSF of weaponizing aid to cement control and gain recognition as the de facto authority in Darfur, a government source said, adding that the UAE has played a “malign role” in the crisis by attempting to tie humanitarian access to negotiations that would preserve the RSF and implicitly legitimize its government.

A member of the RSF-led Tasis coalition, which heads the parallel administration, previously told Mada Masr that figures within the group sent strong messages of condemnation to the RSF leadership over violations against civilians as it was damaging to efforts by Tasis to seek at least symbolic recognition through engaging external actors in connection with aid.

While Khartoum prioritizes breaking the siege of Fasher, another Foreign Ministry source told Mada Masr, it sees in the delivery of  humanitarian aid a means to that end. On the other hand, the RSF, the source added, seeks to use the city’s fall as leverage in future negotiations with the government.

The military fears that losing Fasher would hand the RSF control over all of Darfur, opening the door to political bargaining that Khartoum could not easily contain.

Military-allied Darfuri leaders, however, have their own concerns. Fasher has a strategic importance in its role as the main base for the joint force of the armed movements — a coalition largely composed of Darfuri armed groups. Minawi and other leaders of the joint force are afraid that the fall of Fasher could translate into reprisals for their communities.

Yet divisions have emerged among the joint force and military commanders. Some argue that aid must be allowed in by any means necessary to avert catastrophe, while others insist that humanitarian access can’t come at the cost of legitimizing the RSF, according to a senior source in the joint force. The latter camp sees the siege as a source of leverage in political talks and calls for continued operations in Kordofan to reach Fasher, along with intensified airdrop missions.

Burhan, for his part, is seeking a dual approach — engaging in dialogue with international partners, particularly the United States, to reinforce his government’s legitimacy as Sudan’s representative authority, while simultaneously pursuing military arrangements that allow for airdrop operations, a source in the Foreign Ministry told Mada Masr.

Yet Washington has repeatedly let him down.

The question of aid featured prominently in talks with US officials in Zurich in mid-August, an informed source in the TSC told Mada Masr at the time. The delegation rejected claims that the government was slow in facilitating aid deliveries, outlining instead the government’s efforts to ensure aid reached its destinations amid RSF attacks on convoys. The source saw the discussions promising in a way that “could help build mutual trust.”

Disillusionment for the government set in by mid-September when the US-led Quad presented a roadmap proposing a process starting with a three-month ceasefire and humanitarian access, leading to a civilian transition. The TSC and Foreign Ministry rejected the plan, calling it foreign interference inconsistent with the roadmap the government had set out.

Khartoum sees the Quad’s plan as a reversal of earlier US assurances that the crisis would be resolved in line with its own political framework.

According to a senior TSC official, the government conveyed its displeasure to US officials, including Massad Boulos, who had taken part in the Zurich meeting, over the Quad’s statement.

Now Khartoum faces calls from other international parties to compromise and ameliorate the humanitarian situation, which fly in the face of its continued military push.

Minawi faced such calls during his September foreign tour from international actors — including the EU and France — to act on the humanitarian crisis, according to a senior figure in Minawi’s Sudan Liberation Movement.

EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa Annette Weber also contacted RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo on September 24 to push for aid delivery, urging for “restraint.”

Despite the surge in international engagement, Khartoum continues to reject any process that could grant legitimacy to the RSF, while the paramilitary group seeks to use the humanitarian crisis as leverage to gain recognition.

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Machar’s trial enters decisive phase, judge rejects defense challenges

The trial of South Sudan’s First Vice President and opposition leader Riek Machar has entered its actual start, with proceedings in Juba reaching their sixth session since opening in mid-September.

The first three hearings were taken up by procedural disputes. But the fourth session on September 29 marked a turning point. The court dismissed all objections from the defense, including the argument seen as their strongest card: Machar’s claim to constitutional immunity under the 2018 deal.

By the fifth hearing on Wednesday, the statement from the first co-defendant marked the effective launch of the trial, despite ongoing complaints that the process is politicized. In the sixth session, which took place on Friday, Machar gave his statement before the court, after which hearings were adjourned until October 6.

Machar’s defense lawyers told Mada Masr that the presiding judge has already issued several decisive rulings during the fourth session that they said would directly shape the direction of the case.

Machar and seven senior members of his Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) face charges of murder, treason, conspiracy, financing terrorism and crimes against humanity in connection with the killing of around 250 soldiers in clashes earlier this year in the town of Nasir, Upper Nile.

At the latest hearing on Friday, Machar refused to recognize the special investigative committee established by the Justice Ministry, his lawyers told Mada Masr. He argued that his constitutional immunity shields him from prosecution while in office, calling the investigation “illegal” and clashing with the transitional constitution. He pledged not to cooperate with the committee.

During the session, prosecutors submitted four documents as evidence: an authorization letter to initiate the trial, an executive arrest order against Machar, a ministerial order establishing the investigation and prosecution committee and a National Transitional Legislative Assembly lifting the parliamentary immunity of one of the co-defendants. Despite defense objections, the judge admitted all documents into the case file.

On September 29, during the pivotal fourth session, the court had already ruled against the defense’s jurisdictional challenges, asserting full authority under the transitional constitution. The judge added that the hybrid court envisioned in the 2018 peace agreement was legally irrelevant since it has not yet been established or made operational.

Machar remains part of the transitional government under the 2018 deal, thus his legal team argues that any disputes involving the signatories — Machar and President Salva Kiir — must be adjudicated by the hybrid court overseen by guarantors of the peace process.

The trial has also been marked by the expulsion of two defense lawyers, Deng John Deng and Warnyang Kiir, after it was determined that they had not renewed their bar licenses.

A Justice Ministry source told Mada Masr the court made clear that the lawyers could only return with approval from the Chief Justice. An SPLM-IO source said the removal of two of Machar’s key lawyers shows that the trial was merely a political maneuver by President Salva Kiir to weaken Machar’s defense at a critical stage in the court proceedings.

The court also rejected the challenge against the justice minister’s communications with lawyers in the defense team, ruling the procedure did not breach legal principles. The minister had contacted certain private lawyers before the court sessions to clarify technical points. The defense considered this a breach of procedure.

The most significant motion — seeking recognition of Machar’s constitutional immunity — was also rejected, with the court clarifying that such protections apply only to the president, not to other constitutional positions. With that ruling, the court eliminated the defense’s strongest argument for halting proceedings against Machar.

The court then named Petroleum Minister Puot Kang Chol as the first co-defendant to give a statement for Thursday’s fifth session. Although Machar was slated to be the first, the defense team told Mada Masr that there were concerns that he would turn the courtroom into a platform to broadcast his messages.

Ateim Beyour, a human rights defender in Juba, told Mada Masr that the rejection of immunity claims, the confirmation of jurisdiction and the expulsion of two defense lawyers marked the actual start of the trial. Beyour argued that it is time to accept the course of the court, outside of narrow political and factional perspectives.

But SPLM-IO spokesperson Pal Mai Deng dismissed Kiir’s moves as “a clear politicization of the judiciary,” calling the trial “a farce in the history of South Sudan and its people.”

A source from the ruling SPLM, however, argued Machar will turn the courtroom into a spectacle in order to maintain his presence on the scene and push for amendments to the 2018 peace agreement, thereby securing his place in power and capitalizing on the tensions he could stir amid neighboring countries’ fears of a meltdown.

“That is why the trial must be thorough and strict in handling the files before it,” the SPLM source said. “And if it is proven that Machar is not involved, then he will certainly be released.”