Why Sisi won’t bring stability

Over the last three years many political decisions were connected to the idea of stability. Saying “yes” in constitutional referenda was necessary to regain stability. And now, as it looks, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi will run for presidency and it seems likely that he will win. Most people who will vote for him will do so because they want stability. Some revolutionaries seem surprised by this, and you often hear explanations of current events underlining that Egypt is being exceptional and different. But seeking stability makes Egyptians normal. People all over the world seek stability and are adverse to change, and the older they are, the stronger this character trait becomes. When change and the unknown are seen as dangerous, the known and tried solutions seem preferable, even if they are not perfect.

Why do people believe that voting for a constitution would bring stability, even if good arguments were made that it would not? This is mostly for three reasons: firstly, stability is traditionally connected to the military in Egypt and if the military seems to support a specific electoral outcome, people tend to believe this might lead to stability, partially because they have not had the chance to gain a lot of voting experience. Secondly, we feel substantially better believing we have a certain amount of control over our destiny or influence on what is going to happen. This psychologically tricks us into believing that voting would lead to stability. Lastly, voting against the constitution would have produced an unknown and unpredictable outcome, which is perceived as less safe and less stable.

The problem at this point in time is that no short-term decision will magically produce stability, neither a constitution, nor voting for Sisi. Why is that? The short answer is because of the revolution. The revolution shook all the different parts of society and it will take time for everything to recalibrate. But what exactly are all the different parts of society?

The state institutions are now all vying for more influence and power. The Mubarak regime had a fine-tuned equilibrium between the army, the police and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). As the constitution writing process has demonstrated, all different institutions are trying to mark their claims, including the army, police, judiciary, parliament, presidency and others. Even if none of these institutions challenges the presidency directly, they will fight turf wars among each other, and you know what that means for the rest of us.

The state bureaucracy was functional — more or less — under Mubarak. Since the January 25 uprising, however, some ministries have seen a very fast turnover of ministers. Every minister has changed some key staff, and the new staffers have surely brought in some of their own people, etc. It is likely that many ministries will still see at least two more ministerial changes this year. That means, who ever will be the new president cannot simply pick things up where Mubarak left off. By now, the routines of many ministries have been disrupted in a manner that distorted their accumulated institutional and technical knowledge. Getting the ministries to work as well as they did under Mubarak — albeit the grave inefficiencies then — will be a challenge. The ministries’ inability to provide essential public services, infrastructure and other essential facilities to the people directly affects stability.

The political parties might be overall one of the weaker forces in Egypt, but it is still important that the next president will not have an NDP equivalent — at least not yet — to rely on in Parliament. Most likely a coalition of parties will form the government and even if all of these parties swear allegiance to the president, they will compete with each other, which will bring volatility and problems into the government. As the current British government demonstrates, coalition governments are difficult and Egypt, like Britain, has no experience with coalitions. That means more political struggles to watch out for.

The Islamists will automatically be a source of instability. Yes, under Mubarak they were somehow extra-legal. But the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis had an established strong leadership. And the Ikhwan leadership had some sort of mutual arrangement with Mubarak that he would more or less let them be, and they would not rock the boat. That was good for Mubarak because it secured stability and it was good for the Ikhwan leaders because it ensured they remained in control. With all the developments since, the Muslim Brotherhood does not only have to restructure its own internal leadership, which surely will lead to internal struggles and will ripple into society as a whole, but additionally more militant groups will get increased support. No matter how a future president decides to deal with groups like Ansar Beit al-Maqdes, they are probably here to stay, at least for now.

Macro economically the challenges are huge. For now, the government is able to hide that by covering the budget deficit with cash from the Gulf, but it is unlikely that Gulf governments will bankroll Egypt indefinitely. Two things will result from this economic debacle: the Egyptian pound will lose value against the dollar and the government will be forced to restructure subsidies and increase taxes. Considering that poverty levels have gone up since 2011, it is likely that any attempt to implement such policies will be complicated. After all, when then-President Mohamed Morsi attempted to implement even a minor increase of the metro ticket prices, an immediate uproar prompted him to retract the plan the same evening, declaring it was all a misunderstanding.

Micro economically Egypt is doing surprisingly well, which most likely has to do with the odd structure of the domestic economy. As a result, so far very few companies and factories have closed completely. But prolonging this state of instability will lead to more companies eventually shutting down. When a factory moves abroad, it does not come back when the situation calms down because of the costs of moving. And when a company closes, it is usually shuttered for good. Fewer operational companies and factories mean fewer jobs, which means more unhappy people, which means more trouble.

Furthermore the transition will go on for quite some time. Once the president is elected, parliamentary elections will take place, and next local council (or municipal) elections will have to be arranged and probably a good number of governors will be replaced in that period. Each election and each of these changes bring local divisions to the surface and lead to frictions between the various parties involved.

Additionally, Egypt has seen a social change, which has not reached its full potential yet. The age group, which was between 14 and 20 in 2011, has a socio-political understanding that is shaped by the revolution. Their way of thinking about everything, from family issues to the state, is radically different to even their siblings who are five years older. As the continued problems in the universities demonstrate, just upping security on the campus is not actually having much impact. If the youth’s meager turnout at the referendum is any indicator, it tells us that this generation does not think that current events reflect their ambitions and one way or another, they are eventually bound to make an impact on the political scene.

Should Sisi become the next president, he will have to deal with all these factors simultaneously, but for now he seems to be surprisingly successful at uniting different social factions. This might very well be because, for now, Sisi is an “imagined” president. We can project on him whatever we want. Once Sisi becomes the president, some of the groups currently supporting him are going to be disappointed. Some will react with demonstrations and strikes; shooting or arresting everyone who dares to disagree is not really a solution that will stabilize the country.

As a result, stability is not on the menu. Whether you think Sisi is a good man, and his dreams are visionary, or if you say that he is a strong leader and on top of all that also handsome, or if you believe the total opposite, it does not really matter. Sisi will not bring stability, simply because he can not. And neither could anyone else for that matter. No matter what the next president does, things will remain volatile and probably at times violent.

Of course, specific policies can make this country’s condition better or worse, and if you ask me, the lack of transitional justice and the exclusionist politics of the last six months are far from promising. A couple of things, which might help slightly, would be openness, transparency and creative policies. But when was the last time you heard of such attributes in relation to military men? Such necessary political traits are not part of their job; it is not what they are trained for.

Alas, stability remains a “Fata Morgana” — a mirage. And be assured that moment will come when the thirsty travellers will realize that. What happens then is anyone’s guess.