We need better analysis than this

In a recent article for Middle East Eye (published on January 14), Joseph Massad warns us that “Secular liberals destroyed the Arab uprisings. Don’t let it happen again.” Ten years after the Arab uprisings, what I find more worrying is that academics, intellectuals and pundits have still not given up their urge to pontificate and legislate on everyone’s behalf. Maybe this, too, played a role in “destroying the Arab uprisings”? Even I can’t gather up the confidence to make such a statement. What I do know, though, is that an Arab audience deserves better analysis than this. 

It is not even clear who Massad’s intended audience is. Who should actually heed his warning? This situation is made worse by the fact that he seems to be uninterested in starting a conversation or speaking with anyone. Instead, all we get are harsh judgements spoken at us from a high podium. This is not an invitation to understand anything. It is a trial.

I have a few responses to some of the claims Massad makes in his article which merit some more reflection. 

“Western tentacles are at play in every Arab country, as they are around the world - and they had a crucial role in bringing about the outcome, if not the inception, of some or all of the Arab uprisings.” 

Massad had decided on his conclusion in advance of the analysis. Effectively, his conclusion is this: there’s only one power and agency that matters, and that is the West and its “tentacles.” The West is like a demiurge, an Uncaused Cause, from which all creation pours forth. Therefore all the other facts will be determined according to this view of world history. Meanwhile, all other agencies receive their power from that great demigod, unless they carry the Professor’s favor. I don’t know how any viable criticism of imperialism could start from this premise. 

But the political implications of it are dangerous too. We cannot speak of multiple imperialisms and the competition between them. We cannot speak of how those multiple imperialisms are empowered by flailing American hegemony. And therefore, we cannot speak of capital, which knows no nationality. Masaad’s analysis could have worked before 2011 — maybe — but history moves, and it’s messier than his dogmatic worldview. 

Now to my real concern with Massad’s reading. 

“[W]hat doomed the outcome of these struggles was the liberal, middle-class leadership of the uprisings, secular and Islamist alike, who demanded only political and civil, but not economic rights.”

Who, exactly, belongs in this list of “liberals?” Massad leaves this category vague and undefined, so that the accusation is inclusive enough of everyone whom he dislikes now or in the future. I think we also deserve a better class analysis than this. But let’s unpack the strong claims being made here. 

Firstly, who are the “liberals” or the “secular liberals” Massad is indicting? Those who supported the restorationist regimes. A few prominent names could come to mind: politicians like Mohamed ElBaradei and Hamdeen Sabahy (who did demand economic rights)? Or intellectuals like Ibrahim Issa, Sonallah Ibrahim and Alaa al-Aswany? Or groups like April 6 (the founders of which are now in prison, by the way)? Actually, no. Those are never named by Massad. Instead, by the end of the article, he gets a bit more specific.

“The lesson of the last decade, however, is that the only way to achieve political and economic democracy is for the Arab peoples, like all peoples around the world, to dispense, in their activism and organizing, with western-NGO-supported local secular liberals who hijack their struggles and uprisings, and rid themselves of the imperial hypocrisy of the rhetoric of ‘human rights.’” 

Now it’s clear whom we’re talking about. 

Never mind that this article is written a few weeks after one of the biggest security attacks against the local Egyptian human rights community. 

Also never mind the fact that many of the so-called “secular liberals” (according to Massad’s definition) are languishing in prison and have been for years. Although I do not think they would identify themselves as secular liberals, Masaad would definitely see them as such. Their crime? Believing in civil and political rights. Think of Mahienour al-Massry, Esraa Abdel Fattah, Alaa Abd ElFatah, Sanaa Seif, Mohamed Adel, Ayman Abdel Moaty, and many others. Not to mention those who struggle with harassment, travel bans, and character assassination on a daily basis. This does not look exactly like being a restoration-enthusiast. 

Why does Massad hate civil and political rights so much? Because he believes they always must come at the expense of economic rights like land redistribution, according to him. This position is traditionally a Nasserist or Arab socialist one. The greatest irony, of course, is that Nasserists were much, much friendlier towards the restoration than Massad’s personal enemies. But he does not care for nuances like those. Meanwhile, I want compelling evidence that those defenders of civil and political rights have cheered for the restoration and were blind to its violent repercussions. 

Meanwhile, any serious student of Arab political economy would know that the capitalism we live under has authoritarianism running in its veins. Value extraction — in the form of rent — is only made possible through the crushing and disposing of bodies. Torture and collective punishment is the logic through which this capitalism works. How, I wonder, can we not talk about civil and political rights? And how can we somehow pretend that speaking against torture or demanding due process is somehow being pro-capitalist? What kind of pseudo-Marxism is this? 

If Massad ever bothers to check the history of the Arab human rights movement, he would learn that the most important victories in terms of social and economic rights were actually won through litigation. He would also learn that socialist and communist lawyers have been at the forefront of transforming how we understand civil and political justice. He would learn that those “liberal” rights, such as rights to strike, or a right to trade unions, are necessary in the struggle against capital. He would also learn how those lawyers did not cater too easily to the demands of their funders, but demanded to design their own agenda. And like any political group, they have their share of differences and betrayals and divisions. I would be more worried if they don’t; this would make them politically immature. 

Instead, Massad wants to summon an “Arab peoples” out of thin air who will fight those evil NGOs on his behalf. Massad refuses to admit that we’re not in the 1950s-1960s anymore. There can be no vanguard to uprisings, but Massad wants to invent an imaginary one to punch so that he can become a substitute vanguard. Meanwhile, those in prison now are not too anxious about becoming a vanguard. Perhaps this was their sin? I’m not so sure. But I do admire the political sincerity of this position, and I find it much more intriguing and refreshing than Massad’s archaic fantasies. 

We should criticize the choices made by human rights activists and organizations. We can point out to the increasing moralization, to professionalization, to possible disconnect from social movements, to the fragmentation of agendas or the lack of internal democracy and accountability. Those conversations are necessary. Let’s have a discussion about the history of organizational platforms, the alternatives that were not pursued and what different alternatives remain available. But it is a massive mistake to confuse those questions with an undifferentiated, totalistic accusation against any and all forms of struggle for political and civil rights. In fact, the best way to criticize the professionalization of those NGOs is to take on a more, not less, democratic viewpoint. This is not what Massad is saying. The logical conclusion of Massad’s vision is insidiously authoritarian, because it takes for granted Arab peoples as an unproblematic subject of politics. How is Massad any different from all the authoritarians who claim to speak and embody this Arab peoples? Meanwhile, it may be more worthwhile to give up on finding this Arab peoples, and let us take on the careful, generous, difficult labor of understanding the meaning of our aborted freedom.