From Nasser to Sisi: Max Weber and Egyptian ‘legitimacy’

Egypt’s constitutional referendum is over and now the next round of competition is between the spin-doctors. What does the fact that the constitution passed with a 98.1 percent “yes” vote really mean? And what about the turn out (officially 38.6 percent or 20.1 million)? To address these questions, it might be time to bring out the L-Word. No, not love, legitimacy!

Mohamed Morsi was truly an impressive president. In less than one year he did not only ruin democracy for Egyptians, he also desecrated a perfectly nice word, “legitimacy.” Nevertheless, analyzing this concept of legitimacy might help us to get a better understanding of the turn of events.

The problem with the term “legitimacy” is, like most such political terms (democracy, equality, justice, revolution, coup), there is not one single definition. But in this case we can follow a simple rule of thumb; if in doubt, check if Max Weber, the patron-saint of sociology, said anything on the topic.

Weber did indeed discuss the issue and according to him legitimacy is when the public accepts a governing entity as right and proper. A governing entity can be considered as legitimate when it governs based on public acceptance and does not need to rely on coercion. Weber gives us three forms of legitimacy: traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal.

Interestingly, all the terms that we have been hearing about over the last year in association with legitimacy are completely missing from Weber’s classification. There is no legitimacy of the ballot box, and no mention of democratic legitimacy as such. More importantly, however, legitimacy is not classified as an unconditional attribute, which is somehow given once to a leader, who could just save and use it ever after as a protective amulet; legitimacy is dependent on continuing public acceptance.

This also means that legitimacy is never absolute, but it is gradual; something a leader can and should aspire to. It does not really matter if the population likes the policies of the ruler, but what counts is whether they accept that he has the right and ability to rule in the first place.

Well, what does all that have to do with Egypt? More importantly, which kind of legitimacy will decide Egypt’s next president? Is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, going to be the next president? Is he going to have a charismatic or a rational-legal legitimacy?

But let’s not get ahead of ourselves, and first try to understand the historical development of legitimacy in Egypt.

When Former President Gamal Abdel Nasser took power, he was beloved by the people. He did not stick to any rules and often did rather crazy things (think about the union with Syria for example), yet the people loved him. Nasser had a classical case of charismatic legitimacy. Yes, he was ruling the country as an autocrat, but because he was loved by at least a significant majority of the people, he was not perceived as a tyrant or despot. In fact Weber does not see a contradiction between despotism and legitimacy, as long as this legitimacy is either traditional (by custom or religion) or charismatic. This is not the case, however, with the rational-legal legitimacy.

Now, from Nasser’s reign to the presidency of Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, legitimacy has transformed from being charismatic to being rational-legal. The autocrat no longer needed to be loved, particularly because his legitimacy was derived from institutional, bureaucratic procedures and rules. The state under Mubarak kept law and order — at least to a certain degree. But herein lies the problem.

The state itself did not sufficiently function by those laws and it was increasingly not trusted to follow its own rules. In short, the system became despotic, or the despotism of the system eventually became apparent and therefore the leadership was no longer perceived as legitimate.

Then came the revolution. And that’s where things get kind of messy, analytically speaking.

According to Weber revolutions are non-legitimate forms of change, which produce illegitimate forms of power (in their direct aftermath). It is important to note here that Weber, as far as I understand his writings, does not consider this to be a value- judgment, so to speak. Revolution in his mind is not bad per se, but it is illegitimate.

During the January 25 revolution people have discussed the idea of revolutionary legitimacy and one could possibly argue that the revolution has charismatic legitimacy, but let’s stay with Weber’s analysis for the moment.

After the revolution we find a power structure, which as Weber points out, is illegitimate. But by virtue of it being a transitional period, the aim is to transition back to legitimate rule. One can wonder whether the revolution would have had wider popular support, if the transition had happened faster, or are these two things not connected?

Either way, Hussein Tantawy, the head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) at the time has, willingly or not, guided the transitional process towards an election-based system, which was supposed to lead to rational-legal legitimacy.

While charismatic legitimacy can emerge relatively instantaneously, rational-legal legitimacy depends on the populace’s trust for the ruler and the system and therefore only emerges slowly. SCAF’s slow and budged transitional process (a parliament was first elected and then resolved) was not conducive to boosting people’s confidence in the system.

Eventually Morsi came to power through a rational-legal act, nonetheless, but he was quick to break the rules. This became apparent in at least two incidences. First, on November 22, 2012, when he passed a constitutional declaration, which gave him expanded powers, thus destroying the trust of a large part of the population that he would abide by the law. Then, in December 2012, the Ettehadiya presidential palace clashes left eight anti-Morsi protesters killed, tens reportedly tortured, and hundreds injured at the hands of Morsi supporters, who had been deployed outside the palace.

The significance of this last incident centers on how Morsi’s resort to his “private militias” instead of the legitimate law enforcers (the police), has raised doubts about his respect for, and abidance by, the law. The incident was also alarming, as it raised concerns about the degree to which he would rely on coercion instead of acceptance in his rule.

An interesting aspect regarding Morsi’s presidency lies in the fact that, while aiming for rational-legal legitimacy at the national level, he had traditional legitimacy within the Brotherhood. Traditional legitimacy, as stated earlier, describes any type of rule, which is accepted because of custom, tradition or religion.

These different layers of legitimacy might in part explain why the Ikhwan could not understand or accept that Morsi had indeed lost his legitimacy from the perspective of many, if not most non-Brotherhood Egyptians. For most Egyptians, his legitimacy was rational-legal and conditional on his own respect of the law, which was called into question after at least the two incidences mentioned above.

Then comes Tamarod, an activist group leading a signature campaign, with the demand that Morsi should step down, arguing he had become undemocratic. Morsi defends himself by claiming that he has legitimacy. In the end, the majority of the people who took to the streets on 30 June, mostly did so not because of democracy or legitimacy per se, but because of the lack of stability and security, as well as the queues in front of petrol stations.

At the same time observers abroad called for Egyptians to trust the “democratic” process. But why would they? The process is new, has no established trust, and has so far only produced negative results.

And then the army takes power, which is, as I discussed above, inherently illegitimate and undemocratic, no matter how many people demonstrated and no matter if you call it a coup or a revolution.

The new government quickly declares a roadmap, a plan to return to an election-based system, which is supposed to have rational-legal legitimacy. First step, the constitution shall be redrafted. A body (the 50-member committee) is called upon, which without question is more reflective of the diversity of Egyptian society than the previous, Brotherhood-led constitutional assembly, but this still does not make it legitimate or democratic. The new 50-member committee edits the 2012 constitution slightly (and mostly to the better) and finally this constitution is put up for a referendum by the interim president Adly Mansour.

The interim government and private businessmen, who support it, launch a massive campaign rallying people to go vote “yes.” Why vote yes? Is it a yes against terrorism, a yes for Egypt, or for Sisi? All of that has little to do with the constitution, but the referendum is not primarily about the constitution.

Dispersed groups attempt to launch a “no” campaign, but posters are removed and the no-campaigners are detained on questionable grounds. In the meantime an arrest wave against both the Muslim Brotherhood members and various activists continues unabated, which unsurprisingly frightens those who might have considered voting no. Eventually a vote happens, which procedurally was relatively clean (why wouldn’t it be, after they made sure everyone votes yes anyway) except for minor issues. For example, the secrecy of the ballot was not properly guaranteed in some voting stations.

Now, what are we to make of this? As various observers have already pointed out, this was not a free and fair vote. No, it does not matter what happens on voting day, if basically not a single pre-condition for a free and fair vote is fulfilled. And no, this referendum does not endow the state or the new system with the rational-legal legitimacy it was aiming for, as it is obviously willing to bend the laws at whim.

That being said, there were still a lot of people who went to vote; it was not a Mubarak style election or referendum after all.

I believe that something else has happened during this transitional period. Sisi has gradually reached a level of popularity and public adoration that has granted him charismatic legitimacy. And charismatic legitimacy, as discussed before, does not depend on rules and laws. The referendum was not democratic; it might not even have been a referendum in that sense, but more of a performance with ballot boxes.  It still clearly reflected a popular admiration of the General. And so, for now, the ruling regime has succeeded in becoming legitimate, albeit not democratic.

This, however, tells us something about the imminent future. If the government wants to retain this charisma-based legitimacy, then Sisi has to run for president. If Sisi does not run, he cannot be the anchor for the legitimacy of the system and therefore the government will be forced to attempt a return to a rational-legal legitimacy, which at this point might be challenging.

The question now is whether Sisi can retain this popular adoration should he become the next president, especially considering all the economic, social and political challenges, which are still ahead, or if his popularity is merely a bubble?

Weber reminds us that charismatic legitimacy is often short-lived. If it does end, will he attempt to consolidate his basis by a rational-legal legitimacy, which could eventually lead to political openness and an internal confrontation with the traditional powers, which are now backing him? Or will he stick to a populist discourse and expand the coercive policies, which would then possibly lead to a new wave of revolt?