Did we get the US position on Egypt wrong?

There is a popular sense that the United States strongly supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and had a deep interest in its coming to power. I argue that there is a need to reconsider Washington’s perspective on Egypt, particularly pertaining to its support for Brotherhood rule. 

The belief that Washington has been grooming the Brotherhood to rule Egypt is largely a consequence of the abysmal performance of the Obama administration in responding to developments in the country since 25 January 2011. The trouble began the day then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the following announcement during the uprising against Hosni Mubrak’s rule: “Our assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people.” Thus began two and a half years of largely unwelcome commentary from Washington on Egypt.

Ever since January 2011, the US has repeatedly appeared to large sections of the population to be on the wrong side and against the interests of the Egyptian people. When the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took power, the US was quite deferential to the military junta and failed to level many of the criticisms activists were hoping for. As is often the case, the US sat back, calling for ‘patience’ at first and only pressuring the SCAF to accelerate the transition when it became clear that stability in Egypt was being compromised by the generals’ failure to deliver political progress.

The SCAF might have even had a hand in mobilizing anti-American sentiment and general xenophobia by insisting that virtually every instance of substantial unrest was associated with some “invisible foreign hand” interfering in Egypt’s affairs and trying to bring down the state.

Other rumors suggested that the US was the architect of the entire Arab Spring, had brought down Mubarak, and installed SCAF and later the Muslim Brotherhood as part of its agenda of establishing a new order in the Middle East. When Morsi won the presidency a year ago, some even believed the results were fabricated and that SCAF had been pressured by Washington to declare him the winner. With Morsi’s victory it became established “fact” to many that the US had always wanted to install the Brotherhood in power.

What virtually all these theories fail to consider is the United States' material interests, which inform the vast majority of its foreign policy decisions. The US has three primary concerns, which form what you might call its vital interests in Egypt. Washington wants a trouble-free border between Egypt and Israel, a Suez Canal open for international trade, and a generally quiet and stable Egypt. Unrest in Egypt compromises its interests and can drive up speculation in the oil markets, which hampers economic recovery in the US and Europe.

The American administration would also like Egypt to be open for business and prefers that its economy be stable enough to honor its debt obligations, as failing to do so can force the US and others to bail it out to prevent destabilization. US interest in Egypt’s domestic politics is primarily informed by its desire to protect those interests.

The reality is that the SCAF and Morsi both have preserved most of them. Neither was going to go to war with Israel and both kept Suez open. Both, however, struggled on the stability front. During the SCAF’s 18-month rule following the fall of Mubarak the situation was rocky. Many inside and outside Egypt felt that a coherent elected government would help Egypt progress towards a more stable order. Quite possibly, America pushing the SCAF to deliver elections had to do with that more than any other factor. Additionally, it was difficult for Egypt to secure international financing without a new government as the SCAF’s role was seen as transitional.

If we look briefly at Egypt’s history we can see these same American interests playing out. Once Sadat cut a deal with Israel the US was comfortable with him as president and began giving Egypt billions of dollars in aid to make sure the border stayed quiet. This continued with Mubarak so long as he could deliver on US interests. The US only abandoned him when it became obvious that his presidency undermined Egypt's stability, since the people fearlessly demanded his fall and were increasingly prepared to shut the country down until it happened.

With Morsi the US is faced with a complicated dilemma. If a tradition of street protests and military interventions take hold it may be a very long time before Egypt achieves political and therefore economic stability. Morsi clearly wasn’t delivering stability but the SCAF also failed to in the past. From the perspective of the West, not just Washington, institutions remain highly reliable mechanisms for insuring stability despite the odds, and the overthrow of the institution of the presidency by the military, even when done popularly, could produce instability going forward.

Another factor only beginning to become apparent to us is the potential consequences of Morsi’s ouster following the 30 June Tamarod (rebellion). Washington’s initial backing of the Muslim Brotherhood, just before the 30 June protests, could be read in light of the American’s desire to see a moderation of Islamists' politics through their official participation in democratic political institutions. The fear, which might have led to the hesitancy in the American response to the events on the ground, is that the Brotherhood will stop depending on institutional means to rise to power after being ousted by a military-backed popular rebellion.

The Brotherhood has spent the past 80 years pursuing power. They won both houses of parliament and the presidency in elections. They were then forced from every office they won. Their leadership is being arrested and sent to sit in prison with Mubarak. Even if the Brotherhood leadership continues to call for relative restraint (or at least appears to be doing so publicly), some members will take matters in their own hands, or may be secretly ordered to resort to large-scale violence to destabilize the country. The past two days have shown the beginnings of such violent waves. Let’s not forget that the Brotherhood has housed many famous jihadists who, disillusioned that the pace of change its Guidance Bureau pursued was too slow, later formed more radical movements such as Gama'a al-Islamiya (responsible for massacring tourists in Luxor in the 1990s among many other crimes). Even if Egypt doesn’t experience a full-scale Algeria response it may still go through something similar on a smaller scale. Washington has nothing to gain from violent unrest and terrorist attacks regularly rocking Egypt. In that regard, it is rather unrealistic to assume that the US administration would support the Brotherhood against all odds. It only supported the Brotherhood when it perceived them as a possibly stable regime that moderated the Islamist politics in the country.

In fact, if the US strongly opposed what was taking place it would have called it a “coup,” but instead it chose to describe the situation vaguely and simply request that a return to civilian rule happen as quickly as possible. Barack Obama’s latest statement was completely hands-off: “The future path of Egypt can only be determined by the Egyptian people.” Had the White House described last week’s event as a coup, its aid to Egypt would automatically stop because a US law bans foreign aid to countries that depose elected governments through coups. The priority in Washington with regards to the politics of aid, however, is maintaining access and influence; so the aid will flow regardless of the government in power. If Egypt gets a secular and relatively stable government out of this past week’s events, Washington will undoubtedly be pleased.

I would like to offer on final note on the broader theory that the US somehow orchestrated the Arab Spring and the eventual rise of Islamist parties. The first problem with the theory is the extraordinary confidence it places in the United States’ ability to manipulate politics on the ground throughout the region. Put simply, the US intelligence agencies are not that skilled. They are good at gathering information but not mobilizing the masses and certainly not in a coordinated fashion in several countries simultaneously. The bigger problem with the theory that Washington put the Brotherhood in power is that it fails to answer a simple question, why? Why would the US seek to overthrow one of its closest and most reliable allies, namely Mubarak, and destabilize the entire region in the midst of an economic crisis?

Washington prefers to work with the devil it knows and the Arab Spring has forced it to navigate an increasingly complex security and political landscape throughout the Middle East. For the US, it would be cheaper, easier, and safer if Mubarak and Ben Ali still ruled their countries. The fact that the two first governments to fall victim to the Arab Spring uprisings were two of the West’s closest allies seriously undermines speculation that the US orchestrated these events. It also severely discounts the political agency of Arabs and their ability to take political action without a foreign puppet master.

In the end we cannot forget that we filled the streets demanding Mubarak’s fall. No one paid you or I to be there. The Egyptian people elected Morsi and they took to the streets again to bring about his overthrow. To a large extent, Washington is along for the ride. It only intervenes to make sure its interests don't get run over by Egypt’s accelerating political roller coaster.