A make or break moment in Egypt?

I was asked to write an article about the intensified dispute over the Nile River as part of the inauguration of this new website, launched by the young and dedicated former team of Egypt Independent, to which I was a contributor.

The dependable flow of the great river into Egypt is paramount, and it underlines the urgent need for Egyptians to put their house in order. Nonetheless, I will take a rain check on the topic for now because the current street mobilization of the entire society of Egypt into opposing camps invites immediate comment.

An image that stays in my mind’s eye since the early days of the January 25 revolution was of a middle-aged man from the city of Port Said telling the Al Jazeera microphone that this was the first time he felt he was Egyptian. I took this to mean that the man felt for the first time he had a voice, he had agency. It is what I called then “poetry of the revolution” — the bursting into the open of the long-suppressed spirit of the people of Egypt for freedom and its constituents. 

It was, however, within the mess of the political realm, broadly speaking, that the longings of this spirit were to be approximated. Much water — transparent, turgid, and turbulent — has passed under the bridge since then that was to transport the millions like that Port Said man permanently to the new feeling they had sensed in those heady days.

The millions who poured into the streets of Cairo and other cities this last week tell us unmistakably that the political realm has failed them. The situation now, however, is different and more dangerously slippery than during the January 25 revolution. There is poetry in it, but there is also plenty of unsavory action and discourse.

Then it seemed simple: the majority of the population against an ailing and corrupt regime. This majority seems divided now into two opposing camps, although fragmentation can be easily detected below the surface.

The reasons for taking to the streets among the opposition are various, although the deteriorating economic conditions and services appear to have swollen their ranks. The Islamists and President Mohamed Morsi appeal to what they consider the legitimacy that they achieved through the ballot box, whereas the opposition objects to the Constitution, the exclusionary practices of the Muslim Brotherhood and the many failures of Morsi in running the ship of state. The third force, the army, smartly so far, after miserably mismanaging what was to be a transition to a new political order, has presented itself as the kingmaker and a friend of the people.

In a way, this is arguably a moment of political balance among the various political forces in the country, a make-or-break opportunity for a historic compromise on a workable, inclusive political system. A core demand of the opposition is early presidential elections, which the Islamists, with the exception of the Salafi Nour Party, have rejected at the time of writing and as Morsi himself reiterated in his televised speech on Tuesday night.

Without a doubt, Morsi has not shone as a leader, committing many practical missteps, and delivering speeches often devoid of substance, of information and argumentation that respect the intelligence of the citizenry. In a sense, his presidency has become the symbol and fulcrum of contestation, and whether the Islamists will consent to early presidential elections or choose to put up a good fight will depend on the alignment of forces.

For the opposition, it is unclear what new presidential elections might mean. Will they agree to a single candidate? Will they be able to govern should their candidate win, considering the lack of a solid, organized base, such as the Islamists enjoy, a state apparatus that leaves much to be desired, their inexperience in governance, and deep-seated economic problems and inequalities? Will they be able to maintain a system open to all? Will they be able to deliver to the millions of the poor and unemployed and downtrodden Egyptians? Will they come under the sway of the army? Will they be able to resolve strategic disputes over the Nile, and navigate the regional order? Of course such questions deployed in advance can lead to paralysis, but their weight must inform the calculus of the opposition.

The army has just said it won’t wage a military coup. Power is seductive; however, the generals would do themselves and Egypt a lasting service to stay neutral, acting only as an enabler for the contestants to come together — for they would surely fail in running the country as so many similar regimes in Egypt and elsewhere failed, and their current stardom would fall once more. 

The point is that toppling a terrible regime is easier than establishing a sound one; to guarantee a modicum of success the opposition must not insist on a maximalist stance that would be construed as a demand for surrender by the Islamists. It ought to be kept in mind that, although conditions may be different, Algeria has yet to recover from the bloody civil war that came on the heels of excluding the Islamists, and the Islamists have returned to power in Turkey after the army had deposed their government. 

The Muslim Brotherhood needs to realize that they had a chance and they blew it, thanks largely to a narrow-horizon, inability to work with others, a charity-oriented instead of developmental social policy, and a leadership with a mindset lagging behind the times, certainly behind the dynamic and frustrated youth, even from among their own constituency, whose future is at stake: the sooner they come to such a realization, the better for everyone.

Taking on the presidency of Egypt is an unenviable task, and would have taxed the skills of the most adroit politician. For President Morsi to agree to early elections and spare the country poisonous and potentially destructive polarization would be to live up to his much admired performance in Tahrir Square upon his inauguration, and be a sign of political maturity. History would surely judge such a move as exemplary. The late President Gamal Abdel Nasser tendered his resignation because of the defeat in the 1967 June War, without foreknowledge that people would rally in massive numbers to keep him in power.

Let’s keep our fingers crossed!